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ABSTRACT 
Starting from the experiences of hackers developing free software and open hardware, this 
thesis addresses some key and recurrent themes in the field of Science and Technology Stu-
dies (STS). It poses the question: how are technologies conceptualised, constructed and used 
in ways that render some aspects of them transparent, while leaving others opaque? This 
question is complicated by the fact that what is visible and transparent to some will remain 
opaque to others, depending on the level of technical expertise commanded. The political 
implications of this stand at the heart of my inquiry. Since technical know-how is unevenly 
distributed among groups in society, the same concern can be rephrased as follows: How are  
relations of power and conflict mediated through technology and relations of technical exper-
tise/ignorance? While trying to address this question, the thesis delves into matters of 
epistemology. Just as programming skills are required for seeing what is going on behind the 
computer screen, so theoretically informed reflection can be considered necessary for render-
ing visible social relations not immediately apparent to the casual eye. Discussion of the 
actions of hackers is therefore combined in this thesis with discussion of the alternative 
programmes of research which can be applied to the study of these actions. Two pro-
grammes of research in particular receive attention: the critical theory of technology and 
constructivist science and technology studies (STS). Of these two, the relevance of the for-
mer tradition is emphasized and its value for research in the STS field defended. The thesis is 
composed of four articles and an introductory chapter summarizing and encapsulating my 
concerns. The first article discusses belief in technological determinism among hackers and 
how this does not necessarily stand in opposition to political engagement. On the contrary, it 
is common within hacker politics for contending viewpoints to be articulated in relation to 
seemingly apolitical narratives about technical neutrality and progress. The second article also 
deals with antagonistic relations at the heart of processes of technological change. It argues 
that the punitive actions of law enforcement agencies provide a clear indication of the pres-
ence of asymmetrical power relations in technological change through, for example, attempts 
to suppress filesharing inventions. Hackers are negotiating with legal authorities and the mass 
media, but also amongst themselves, about how to draw the line between the legitimate users 
and harmful misusers of technology. The third and fourth articles are based on a case study 
of a group of Czech hardware hackers who invented a wireless network technology for 
sending data with visible, red light. The challenges faced by these hardware hackers in their 
attempts to design technical solutions capable of being built by non-expert users are dis-
cussed at length in a theoretically-informed fashion. 
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Introduction 
 
Darknet of Light 
A few years ago, if you happened to look out over the rooftops in a Czech town 
at night, you might well have seen red lights glowing on the horizon. Perhaps an 
association to cyberpunk would have crossed your mind. Such a nocturnal aes-
thetic was cultivated by the members of the wireless network community who 
built the light transmitting devices. These devices, called ‘Ronja’, were responsi-
ble for more than a light show as they served to link computers into a network. 
Where the onlooker saw light beams, there were in fact streams of data crossing 
back and forth over the rooftops. Many of the users of Ronja were students 
living in tower blocks. Among them, some had elderly neighbours who did not 
appreciate the light show. Furthermore, these irate neighbours were often influ-
ential on local housing committees. They had, in other words, the authority to 
tell the young residents to take down their devices from the buildings. This 
happened frequently enough to motivate the participants in the wireless net-
work community to look for a technical solution to the dispute. They came up 
with a modified version of Ronja called ‘Inferno’. With Inferno, data transmis-
sion takes place in the infrared as opposed to the red region of the electromag-
netic spectrum. The technical performance with regards to interference from 
rain and fog is basically the same for both kinds of light. However, the problem 
of interference from angry neighbours is markedly lower with Inferno. Thus, 
the stream of data was able to flow freely once more over the heads of the un-
witting neighbours. 
This anecdote, which was related to me during my fieldwork studying the Czech 
wireless network community, illustrates a key issue in this thesis: Through 
which processes are technologies constructed, practiced, and conceptualised so 
that some layers of reality are rendered transparent while others remain opaque? 
The question is complicated by the fact that what is visible and what is con-
cealed in any given technology depends on the technical expertise of the ob-
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server. Furthermore, since this knowledge is unevenly distributed among groups 
in society, the question must be rephrased as follows: how are social conflicts 
mediated through technology and technical expertise/ignorance? This leads me 
to an old sticking point in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
the one centring on the relationship between politics and technology. For some-
thing to become a publicly contested issue, it must first be recognised as such 
by the parties involved. Hence, to render something invisible is a political act of 
the first order.  
There are an abundance of cases in the history of technology showing how 
potential conflicts of interest have been overcome through design choices pro-
ducing invisibility. The anecdote above offers a way of initially reflecting over 
such cases. By going from red to infrared light, a matter of contestation was 
literally removed from view. When this example is extended to include the 
computer network as a whole, with its multiple layers of hardware, protocols 
and applications, the degrees of transparency/opaqueness multiply beyond 
comprehension. It might be objected that such reasoning about politics is rather 
overstated for an example which merely concerns a potential dispute between 
neighbours. The matter gains in gravity, however, when recalling that the bulk 
of the data carried by the light beams was violating Czech and international 
copyright laws. Indeed, one of the goals of the main developers of Ronja was 
precisely to build a computer network which would be able to evade law en-
forcement agencies and other kinds of government regulation. Ronja was, so to 
speak, a ‘darknet of light’. 
 
Key Concerns 
The intervention by the wireless network activists might be welcomed by some 
as a novel approach to politics. If so, this alternative way of doing politics 
comes with impediments of its own. Many of the Czech hackers I talked to 
lamented the difficulties of thematizing computer-related issues when address-
ing a broader public. They identified a need for raising general awareness about 
technical systems in society. This is required so as to enable ordinary users and 
citizens to understand the democratic implications of the spread of digital rights 
management technology, the principle of net neutrality, or the introduction of 
software patents in the European Union, just to mention a few recent contro-
versies. In other words, the Czech hackers attested to the fact that technical 
know-how has become a prerequisite for rendering issues like these visible, and 
thus, contestable in society. This connects to an ancient predicament in political 
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philosophy: the link between knowledge and empowerment. The knowledge in 
question is not familiarity with computer technology but with philosophical 
reasoning. According to the Enlightenment tradition, a capacity for theoretical 
reflection is required of the citizens if they are to raise themselves above the 
immediacy of the present. Only then will they catch sight of their own circum-
stance and render visible the forces which act behind their backs. Thus the 
citizens can become sovereign. This statement invites two common objections. 
Firstly, it has been questioned as to whether such transparency of society can 
ever be achieved. Secondly, the role of the intermediaries has been repeatedly 
scrutinised: the work of representation, and the role of experts and intellectuals. 
The well-known dilemma goes as follows: how can the ordinary citizen be edu-
cated accordingly without it resulting in that her sovereignty is cancelled out in 
the process (Fischbach, 2009, p.84). 
These are the themes I have set out to discuss in this thesis. I do so by focus-
sing on the specific concerns of wireless network activists, free software devel-
opers, open hardware tinkerers, in short, those I elect to categorize as ‘hackers’. 
Theoretically, I firstly draw upon and seek to enter into conversation with the 
critical theory of technology. This is an intellectual tradition which wrestles with the 
theoretical-political concerns sketched out above. The aim is partly to confirm 
the value of critical theory as an intellectual resource in social studies of science 
and technology. One tenet of critical theory is that the questions of what issues 
to study and how to study them cannot be divorced from each other. It is there-
fore in order to ask: what connects hackers with critical theorists? Arguably, the 
common feature they share might be that, at least in the eyes of their respective 
detractors, they are both hopelessly out of date. This being due to their shared 
vulnerability to what is said to be modern fallacies. If this negative portrayal is 
momentarily accepted, if only for the sake of the argument, it allows me to draw 
a parallel between the two and put forward a proposal. Perhaps the apparent 
‘backwardness’ of both hackers and critical theorists also allows them to offer 
fresh angles on the current world order, which, according to received wisdom, 
has become ‘post-modern’, ‘non-modern’, ‘post-industrial’, ‘post-fordist’, ‘post-
human’ and what not. 
The association between hackers and modernism has been elaborated upon by 
Sherry Turkle. Her pioneering ethnographic works about hackers and computer 
users have become standard references in academic discussions. A central ar-
gument advanced by Turkle in Life on the screen is that the development of com-
puter technology is linked to a tectonic shift in episteme, from modernism to 
post-modernism. At one point, she claims that the Macintosh computer is an 
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‘emissary of postmodernist thought’ (Turkle, 1996, p.276). It signals the end of 
an earlier world of computing which had to be instructed by typing command 
lines. With the Macintosh computer, the users could interact with their com-
puters through a graphical interface. She thought this development corre-
sponded with the transition from a modernist culture of calculation to a post-
modernist culture of simulation. While the former culture was captivated by the 
idea of piercing through the interface to find the ‘calculating essence’ of the 
computer, the latter knew better than to ask for anything lying behind the rep-
resentations displayed on the screen. The new and allegedly post-modernist 
culture invited a plurality of co-existing perspectives which undermined the 
epistemologically privileged position which the modernist master-narrative had 
previously assigned to computer elites. Turkle admitted that calculation was still 
going on in the computer, but that it was no longer the important question to 
reflect over or to engage with (ibid, p.18). Although Sherry Turkle did not refer 
directly to Jean-Francois Lyotard, her attempt to connect information technol-
ogy with post-modernism in this way is highly reminiscent of his ideas (Lyotard, 
1984; for a critique: Cooper, 2002). 
As for critical theorists, they have been characterized as outmoded ‘moderns’ 
by, among others, Bruno Latour. He does not condone the schematic division 
of moderns and post-moderns like Sherry Turkle. Neither would he let himself 
be associated with universal claims explicitly linking computer technology with 
an epistemic discovery that ‘we have never been modern’. But the similarities 
between Turkle and Latour remain striking with regards the new way of looking 
at the world they both suggest. Both celebrate the destabilisation of old episte-
mological elites. Both assert that one of the delusions of these old elites was the 
idea that there exists a hidden reality under the surface of things which can only 
be accessed through philosophical reflection and the acquisition of specific 
knowledge: 
The tradition of the human sciences no longer has the privilege of 
rising above the actor by discerning, beneath his unconscious actions, 
the reality that is to be brought to light. (Latour, 1993, p.44) 
Speaking from the perspective of the critical theory of technology, Graeme 
Kirkpatrick has engaged with the work of both Turkle and Latour. With regards 
Turkle, he questions her endorsement of the ‘post-modern’ graphical interface. 
He views this interface in the light of modernist art theory. The ideal advanced 
by the latter is self-reflexivity. Accordingly, modern art should display its own 
technicality. The underlying production process should be visible in the appear-
  19
ance of the artwork. Thus a painting abiding to this ideal should not seek to 
conceal the texture of the brush strokes. To appreciate this approach requires 
prior knowledge on the part of the observer. In other words, a trait of modern 
art theory is that it assigns an epistemological privilege to one perspective over 
others (Kirkpatrick, 2003). Kirkpatrick claims that the outlook of modernist art 
theory resonates with the advocacy of hackers for free access to source code. 
Hackers typically argue that the user must be able to examine and modify the 
software being used. When denied such access by producers and vendors of 
proprietary software, then this will not only have detrimental effects for the 
user, but also for society as a whole. Pursuing this argument, Kirkpatrick points 
to proprietary software as a showcase of how strategies of concealment can be 
used to maintain hegemonic power. Aesthetics, here represented by the graphi-
cal interface of the computer, lend support to this kind of strategy. Conversely, 
technical reason, as personified by hackers, offers a means for resisting the 
powers-that-be. In sharp contrast to Latour, Kirkpatrick concludes that the key 
task for those engaging in social studies of science and technology today, is to 
bring to light asymmetrical structures of domination which reproduce them-
selves at levels which are not addressed in everyday discourse (Kirkpatrick, 
2008, p.157). 
My description of hackers and critical theorists as ‘moderns’ serves to highlight 
a shared, epistemological outlook. Of course, in the case of hackers, this epis-
temology is only implicit. In the case of the critical theorists, it is the centre of 
attention. A key tenet of this epistemology is that social action is framed within 
multiple constitutive frames, each working at different levels of abstraction 
(Cooper, 2002, p.162). In short, reality should be envisioned as layered and not 
a flat surface. This implies that reality does not reveal itself to our senses in an 
immediate fashion. We grasp it only through the mediation of concepts. It fol-
lows that we can only gain access to some levels of abstraction through the 
acquisition of certain knowledge/skills. This in turn leads to the privileging of 
some kinds of knowledge over others.  
Although this may sound overly abstract, these epistemological claims are piv-
otal for, for example, the demands of hackers for public access to source code. 
In making these demands, hackers assume that what is found on the screen can 
diverge from what is actually going on in the centres of calculation behind it, in 
ways which matter both to the individual users and to society as a whole. Unless 
users have some means to examine the instructions guiding their computers, 
they will remain at the mercy of those who wrote these instructions. This state-
ment invites the objection that gaining access to the source code only makes a 
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difference to those lucky enough to know how to program computers. Hence, 
an auxiliary assumption behind the demand for public access to source code is 
that hackers as a collective can reasonably claim to represent the interests of the 
majority of unwitting computer users. These are controversial claims, not to say 
utopian. This is not, however, the place to defend the claims above or introduce 
nuances. For now, it suffices to note the similar significance that hackers assign 
to their programming skills and the powers critical theorists attribute to philo-
sophical reflection. 
According to critical theory, a theoretical idea about the social whole is required 
in order to uncover historically embedded layers of reality. It is by acquiring 
such an elevated point of perspective through philosophical reflection that 
individuals can raise above their immediate, lived conditions. Thus they can 
catch sight of the social relations which otherwise would have remained imper-
ceptible. One consequence of adopting this approach is a shift in focus. When 
looking at hackers, for example, the focus moves from the agency of the hack-
ers to how their social actions are framed within society as a whole. Or, to put it 
differently, this theoretical approach seeks to uncover the always-already consti-
tuted subject position of the hacker. Take, for example, a firm such as Red Hat, 
the most well-known promoter of free software products and services. In or-
ganisational theory and in social movement theory, the term ‘institutional entre-
preneurship’ has been coined to describe this unison of commercial interests 
and political activism. With a critical theory approach, the attention is on the 
limits of such a strategy and on the kind of questions which cannot be raised 
from the subject-position of the institutional entrepreneur. This is not to deny 
the importance of firms like Red Hat for propagating free software solutions in 
place of proprietary software. It is unlikely, however, that the managers of these 
firms will ask how the ills of proprietary software relate to the social whole of 
commodity relations. By saying this, I want to illustrate the kind of inquiries 
which follow when we open the toolbox of critical theory. The choice between 
different epistemological stances, just like the choice between different techno-
logical designs, contributes to rendering some aspects of reality more transpar-
ent, while others are left opaque. 
The aim of the current thesis is to discuss what kind of epistemology and theo-
retical concepts are required in order to bring to light social asymmetries and 
antagonisms shaping the development of technology and technical expertise. 
The practices of hackers have proven to be a rich field for carrying out empiri-
cal investigations into these matters. In fact, this is the research strategy I pur-
sued prior to producing this thesis. My first book, Hacking capitalism: The free and 
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open source software movement, can be seen as containing preliminary formulations 
of many of the perspectives further developed here. I begun writing the book 
after having befriended a hacker, several years before I applied for a PhD posi-
tion. Partly, I wanted to make sense of the things that my friend had related to 
me about hackers. Partly, I wished to become acquainted with theories which 
could explain the world around me. It seemed as if these two lines of inquiry 
could be combined in support of each other. While proceeding in this fashion, I 
was asked to write another book, Allt mitt är ditt: Fildelning, upphovsrätt och 
försörjning. The focus was on the file sharing phenomenon which was growing 
rapidly at the time in Sweden. Both books were completed during my first year 
as a PhD candidate. In the following three years, I have found reason to revisit 
some of the arguments I make in this earlier work. My encounter with other 
research traditions within the STS field has compelled me to modify my way of 
thinking. I have become more aware of the importance of epistemological ques-
tions, even when discussing ordinary and concrete things, such as software 
licenses or computer architecture. The purpose of the current thesis emerged as 
this insight grew on me. This long process of discovery and the revision of my 
earlier ideas about hackers are documented in the four articles collected here. 
The first article, ‘Determining social change: The role of technological deter-
minism in the collective action framing of hackers’ is accepted for publication in 
New Media & Society. Here I ask what collective action might look like in a con-
text where ideas about necessity are preeminent. Belief in technological deter-
minism is widespread among hackers. I propose, however, that the determinist 
narrative is itself under-determined. The case with politicised hackers shows 
how contentious politics can be formulated from within a narrative about tech-
nological neutrality, expertise and progress. The possibility of articulating an-
tagonism in an engineering environment is a theme to which I return in my 
second article, published in Science as Culture with the title: ‘Misuser inventions 
and the invention of the misuser – hackers, crackers and file sharers’. More 
specifically, the issue I address here is how antagonistic relations can be concep-
tualised in a setting where the identities and interests of the purported antago-
nists are subject to perpetual transformation through invention. In other words, 
what theoretical concepts are required in order to render potential conflicts of 
interest visible in such a highly unstable environment? Different approaches to 
the same issue are taken in the two articles based on my case study in the Czech 
Republic. My third article develops a critique of the innovation studies litera-
ture. The presumptions made in this field are such that many levels of user 
invention are ignored by the typical innovation scholar, especially with regards 
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contentious politics. Entitled ‘Free space optics in the Czech wireless commu-
nity: Shedding some light on the role of normativity for user-initiated innova-
tions’, my third article has been accepted for publication in Science, Technology & 
Human Values. The final article expresses the same concerns but this time ad-
dressing constructivist STS theory instead. Under the title ‘Reconstructivism 
versus critical theory of technology: Alternative perspectives on activism and 
institutional entrepreneurship in the Czech wireless community’ this paper has 
been published in Social Epistemology. 
With this introduction, I hope to give the reader some orientation concerning 
the four articles which constitute my thesis. The ambition is to render explicit 
ideas which have shaped the character of the papers, but which have not always 
been fully developed. In the following section, I will define the term ‘hacker’ in 
more detail. In the process I shall critically review some of the earlier literature 
about hackers. Thereafter, I shall present my main theoretical points of depar-
ture. At the centre of discussion will stand the commonalities and divergences 
between constructivist STS and the critical theory of technology. These rela-
tions have preoccupied me during recent years. Thereafter, I discuss the meth-
ods I have used when studying hackers. I take my methodological cue from 
Theodor Adorno’s reflections about balancing immanent and transcendent 
critique when investigating a topic. The final part of this introduction outlines in 
more detail how the individual articles relate to each other and sets an agenda 
for further research. 
 
Who is the “Hacker” 
At the outset I need to say a few words about the key figure at the centre of my 
work: the ‘hacker’. There are several, conflicting notions to be found in the 
academic literature about how to address this figure. Bearing this in mind what 
better place to start looking for a definition than the Jargon file, a widely recog-
nised lexicon of hacker slang? The first entry for ‘hacker’ reads: 
A person who enjoys exploring the details of programmable systems 
and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to most users, who 
prefer to learn only the minimum necessary (Jargon file). 
Three more entries follow stressing the hacker’s aptitude for programming. In 
addition, some general characteristics expected of an individual claiming to be a 
hacker are described, such as enthusiasm, curiosity, and the like. While this 
might offer a point of departure, scholars studying hackers must not stop there. 
The definitions given by the hackers, here represented by the quote from the 
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Jargon file, are too closely intertwined with their internal turf wars, their concern 
with excluding ‘wannabes’, with morale boosting, and so on. To start with, I will 
note a minor problem with the definition of the hacker laid down in the Jargon 
file. It relies heavily on one specific technical practice, i.e. programming com-
puters. With such a definition, it would be stretching it to call the people I am 
looking at in this thesis for hackers. My informants are primarily involved in 
building wireless networks and open hardware. This underlines Christopher 
Kelty’s speculation as to why the task of defining hackers might be particularly 
challenging. The practice of hackers is all about introducing new entities into 
the world. That is to say, hackers create things which overturn existing concepts 
and established modes of representation (Kelty, 2008, p. 94).  
A definition of the ‘hacker’ must therefore be conceived in such a way that it 
stays open-ended towards future developments. Open hardware is a case in 
point. This notion draws heavily from the methodologies and principles which 
were first worked out by free software developers. Many of the people now 
tinkering with hardware have a background as software engineers. Writing code 
and running it on home-brewed machinery are two sides of the same coin. 
Hence, the development of open hardware and free software overlap due to 
technical requirements and personal affiliations. A visit to any of the larger 
hacker conferences in Europe, such as FOSDEM in Brussels or Chaos Com-
puter Club in Berlin, will provide an idea of the rapid expansion of open hard-
ware projects in recent years. Furthermore, just around the corner is a new field 
of ‘open source biology’ (Hope, 2008). Arguably, these phenomena should be 
taken account of in a discussion about what hacking is. 
A definition of the hacker which is not tied down to a single technical practice 
or technology can be found in the tradition of cultural studies. Hackers are 
interpreted here as one youth subculture among others. This approach has been 
put forward by Douglas Thomas (Thomas, 2002). The argument makes sense 
given the overlap existing between hackers and geek and fan subcultures. Cul-
tural studies perspectives have a lot to contribute to the discussion of how to 
delimit the category ‘hackers’. After all, subcultures are all about defining who 
belongs to the group and who does not. The comparisons offered by Thomas 
are valuable also because he stresses how the hacker milieu differs from most 
other subcultures. The identity of hackers is bound up with a practice rather 
than with a style. Thomas finds this to be of importance since it endows hackers 
with a greater amount of self-determination vis-à-vis external influences. In 
contrast, style-based subcultures are more easily swayed by commercial forces 
and are therefore less capable of resisting authority.  
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A common feature of many subcultures, and here Thomas makes no exception 
for hackers, is that their resistance tends to be understood in terms of a ‘genera-
tional conflict’. Hackers are said to be rebelling against the authority of adult-
hood. I would not disagree that there are generational aspects to hacking. The 
stereotypical image of a hacker is a boy or a man in his early twenties. Neverthe-
less, the description of hackers as a youth phenomenon seems less and less valid 
the further we move away from the 1980s and the so-called ‘golden age’ of 
hacking. This is not only due to the aging of individual participants. Equally 
important is the progressive integration of free software development into pro-
fessional life. A large majority of the contributors to free software projects are 
now working in the IT sector or are students on the verge of becoming com-
puter professionals (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). That Douglas Thomas fails to 
take this into consideration might be symptomatic of what has been tradition-
ally a blind spot of the cultural studies approach, i.e. its neglect of the political 
economy. If the stress is placed on the generational aspect of hackers’ resis-
tance, then one will not take full measure of the stakes involved in the political 
struggles of hackers. 
The reasoning above points to an alternative interpretation of hackers as a so-
cial movement. Two spokespersons of this perspective are Paul Taylor and Tim 
Jordan. I agree with them that there is much to be learned from social move-
ment theory. An advantage of this approach is that it asks how hackers consti-
tute themselves as a political subject and begin to act collectively. Inquiries of 
this sort become increasingly urgent the more hackers become entangled in 
struggles against new intellectual property laws, state surveillance and so on. I 
borrow extensively from social movement theory in two of my articles, ‘Deter-
mining social change’ and ‘'Free space optics in the Czech wireless community’. 
Nevertheless, I hesitate to put hackers on an equal footing with any other social 
movement, and I am unconvinced by the attempts of Taylor and Jordan to do 
so. In their writings they tend to focus on hackers with an overt political 
agenda, such as the Cult of the Dead Cow and the Electro-hippies. These 
groups belong to a faction within the larger constellation of hackers who some-
times go under the name ‘hacktivists’. Some issues championed by hacktivists 
include gender equality, immigration rights and alter-globalization critique. In 
other words, much the same agenda as can be found in a politically schooled, 
leftist environment. There are places, for instance in Spain and Italy, where 
hackers and the anarchist movement are closely intertwined. Still, this is more of 
an exception than the rule. A case can be made for arguing that hacktivist poli-
tics is something deriving from an ‘outside’. It does not capture the full spec-
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trum of ideas which have grown from within the practices of hackers. An indi-
cation of this is the frictions which often arise between hacktivists and so-called 
‘techies’, i.e. hackers who claim to be interested in technology for its own sake. 
This does not rule out that the latter can become politicised too. This can hap-
pen, for instance, in response to new intellectual property laws. However, this 
kind of political engagement has its own distinguishing features (Coleman, 
2003). One risks losing sight of the specificity of hacker politics if pride of place 
is given to hacktivists, as opposed to politicised techies. The subcultural lens 
adopted by Douglas Thomas might therefore be more promising in registering 
the heterogeneity and contradictions of hacker politics. 
Even more problematic is the proposition that hackers constitute a new class. 
McKenzie Wark claims that the hacker class stands in opposition to the vecto-
rial class, in much the same way as the working class confronted the capitalist 
class in the past (Wark, 2004). I do not dispute the continued relevance of class 
analysis in a society where an ever larger section of the global population de-
pends on a wage for its survival (Fuchs, 2010). A discussion about hackers can 
be fruitfully connected to the old question about the rise of a white-collar work-
ing class. For instance, Graeme Kirkpatrick has observed that the moral panic 
over hackers in the mass media started in the 1980s. It was at this time that the 
class composition of the computer profession begun to change. If computer 
programming had previously been a resort for the upper middle class, the 
spread of home computers meant that a growing section of the working class 
could now become involved (Kirkpatrick, 2004).  
My problem with Wark’s perspective is not that he uses class analysis, but that 
he does so exclusively from an abstract, theoretical point of view. He says very 
little about the people calling themselves ‘hackers’ and the subjective side of 
class formation. What needs to be explained, in my opinion, is the discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, subjective experiences of belonging to a class, and, 
on the other hand, objective class determinations. This is particularly pertinent 
in the case of hackers, since their self-image largely stems from college life, fan 
subculture, amateurism, and, sometimes, entrepreneurial aspirations. In other 
words, settings not firstly associated with wage earning and corporate organisa-
tion (Liu, 2004). This outsider identity seems to become increasingly out-of-
sync the more free software development becomes integrated into professional 
structures. Andrew Ross was one of the first to argue that hacking should be 
seen in the light of labour conflicts. I have explored this idea in some of my 
previous writings (Ross, 1991; Söderberg and Dafermoes, 2009; Söderberg, 
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2009). I doubt, however, that much insight can be gained from interpreting 
hackers as a new class in their own right. 
My main objection to Wark is that the everyday life of hackers hardly ever en-
ters into his theoretical reasoning. The opposite problem is common in descrip-
tive works about hackers. A number of well-researched books have been pub-
lished in the wake of the success of the free software movement (Benkler, 2006; 
Moody, 2001; Weber, 2004). These tend to be written by academics who sym-
pathise with ideas about information freedom. My reservation with regard this 
genre is that the self-representations of hackers are reported by the scholars 
down to the point that the exclusions, omissions and so on made by the former 
are faithfully reproduced by the latter. A case in point is the definition given in 
the Jargon file. Hacking is here presented as if it was all about writing software, 
resulting in an exclusion of practices classified as ‘cracking’. While free software 
development is closely associated with positive values such as information shar-
ing and transparency, the hacker subculture is just as much about secrecy and 
stealth. My basic claim is that the definitions provided by the people calling 
themselves ‘hackers’ cannot be accepted at face value. The definitions put for-
ward by them, just as much as the terms circulating in the mass media, are the 
outcome of conflicts and negotiations. The benevolent, lawful free software 
developer is highlighted in order to improve the tarnished, public image of the 
hacker. These negotiations feed into the larger political struggles which hackers 
are involved in, concerning intellectual property laws, net neutrality and so on. 
It is not hard to see, then, why many academics want to contribute to the im-
provement of the public image of hackers. 
The thrust of my argument so far has been that ‘hackers’ should be defined in a 
loose and open-ended fashion. The definition cannot be reduced to a single 
technology and related technical practices, such as writing free software code. I 
have hinted at the need for a definition which takes account of a shared culture. 
Reversely, however, the specificity of the hacker vis-à-vis other groups would be 
lost, if all references to technical practices were abandoned. Indeed, the words 
‘hacking’ and ‘open’ have often been used indiscriminately. An example of this 
is when artists and activists involved in ‘culture jamming’ claim to be doing a 
kind of hacking. Against these claims, I believe that some connection to techni-
cal practices must be maintained. This is crucial if one is to make sense of the 
strong, meritocratic values of hackers. Being skilled is the central axis by which 
hackers distinguish themselves from lammers, n00bes and AOLers, to mention 
a few of the dismaying epithets for ordinary computer users. Furthermore, 
hacking does not concern just any technology. Otherwise, hackers could not be 
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separated from tinkerers and inventors at large. There must be a connection, 
however remote, to practices relating to infrastructures for information process-
ing. A concrete example hereof is the hackers developing so-called ‘open cars’, 
such as OSCar and C’mm’n projects. On the face of it, their practices might not 
be all that different from what goes on in a motor club. Crucially, though, these 
development projects are linked to adjacent hacking activities. They are inspired 
by the methodologies used in free software development, and they subscribe to 
the same moral codes, such as the centrality of information sharing.  
The definition I am myself drawn towards comes close to what has been pro-
posed by Christopher Kelty. On the one hand, his ethnographic work suggests 
that there is a particular hacker or geek identity shared by people in many places 
around the world. He recognises that scholars need a concept for addressing 
this commonality. On the other hand, he is aware of the pitfalls of categorising 
such a heterogeneous collective which, to make matters worse, is always in the 
process of becoming something else. He evokes the notion of a ‘public’ to wed 
together these conflicting points of consideration. The concept of a public is 
sufficiently vague to include an unspecified number of diverging phenomena, 
while, concurrently, being coherent enough to allow for collective action. It is in 
its role as a counter-balance to power that Kelty finds parallels between the 
eighteenth century public and the present one. While the old public was tied to 
the spread of coffee houses and the news media, among other things, the public 
which is now emerging builds on free software, open network standards, and 
the like. He speaks of the latter as a ‘recursive public’. Through this, Kelty 
wants to stress that this public is geared towards defending/expanding the con-
ditions of its own existence. Crucially, this takes place simultaneously on a dis-
cursive level and on the level of infrastructure. The notion of ‘recursion’ cap-
tures well the apolitical ‘techie’ who has become politicised in response to new 
intellectual property laws. Defending the legal and technical infrastructure re-
quired for writing software is a way of sustaining the hacker community, and, in 
the last instance, ones own existence as a hacker.  
There are also some areas where I have problems with Christopher Kelty’s 
account. I do not agree with his decision to abandon the word ‘hacker’. He 
argues that the term has become too loaded with connotations about subver-
siveness and/or criminality. Thus he prefers to use the word ‘geek’ instead 
(Kelty, 2008, p.35). I disagree with this choice for the following reason: the 
people in question still refer to themselves as ‘hackers’. To them, at least, the 
meanings invested in this word remain pertinent. A second reason for sticking 
to the term hacker is that it foregrounds technical practices more than the term 
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‘geek’ does. Finally, I do not think that the notion of a recursive public exhausts 
the problems encountered when trying to define the figure of the hacker. It 
cannot do justice to, for instance, the element of labour conflict which becomes 
more pronounced as free software development is integrated into corporate 
structures and professional life. Aside from these differences, Kelty’s reasoning 
about the ‘geek’ is close to my understanding of the ‘hacker’. With this term I 
am referring to a loose constellation of people who share similar ideas and val-
ues, ultimately anchored in certain kinds of technical practices. These technical 
practices must in one way or another relate to infrastructures of information 
processing. Despite being heterogeneous and perpetually changing, the shared 
identity of hackers is verified in that they from time to time can act as a con-
certed, political force. In other words, they constitute a ‘recursive public’. This 
public is recursive in the sense that it tends to act in response to threats to the 
infrastructure upon which it depends. 
 
Between Constructivist STS and Critical Theory 
In this thesis, the relationship between technology and politics is investigated 
through studies of the practices of hackers. I approach the relationship by draw-
ing upon a range of theoretical traditions. For the sake of orientation, I will 
indicate some of the sources of inspiration which have, directly or indirectly, 
contributed to my reasoning. A turning point for me was to encounter the theo-
retical-political writings of authors like Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière and 
Chantal Mouffe. In their own distinct ways, these authors have protested 
against a post-political social order. They have affirmed the continued relevance 
of the concept of antagonism for philosophical reflection. In addition, various 
strands of Marxism have enriched my writing at different stages. A non-
exclusive list would include labour process theory, Autonomist Marxism and 
Open Marxism. Social movement theory, especially where it touches upon ques-
tions of epistemology, has been another source of inspiration in my work. 
However, the two theoretical traditions which my thesis leans most heavily on 
are critical theory and constructivist STS. In order to provide a concise and 
balanced summary of my intellectual journey, I will restrict the following discus-
sion to a comparison between the latter two schools. Ideas from other theoreti-
cal traditions mentioned above will be brought in as a supplementary resource. 
The relation between critical theory, on the one hand, and constructivist STS 
theory, on the other, has been a major theme throughout my research. I will 
elaborate upon this relationship by looking more closely at three authors who 
have engaged with the STS literature from a critical theory perspective. Most 
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renowned among them is Andrew Feenberg who advocates a synthesis between 
the two schools, something he calls ‘critical constructivism’. He has been sup-
ported, and, on occasions, opposed, by Graeme Kirkpatrick and Simon Cooper. 
All of them believe that an updated version of critical theory can form the epis-
temological foundations for STS inquiries. Such a proposal is conceivable, 
Feenberg argues, since many theoretical and methodological concerns are 
shared by the two traditions (Feenberg, 2008). I wish to address these similari-
ties while seeking to clarify what remains hard to reconcile between critical 
theory and constructivist STS. In one sentence, this is the dialectical heritage of 
the former which clashes with the post-structuralist influences of the latter. In 
particular, a key sticking point between the two traditions is the concept of 
‘totality’. What political strategies follow from either maintaining or abandoning 
this concept? It is from the point of view of the social whole that critical theory 
claims to be able to transcend the horizons of the individual actors themselves. 
In other words, this philosophical idea is the key for engaging in ideology cri-
tique and for guiding praxis. An example of ideology critique, alluded to in the 
introduction, would be to develop a theoretical understanding which renders 
visible social conflicts and struggles which are mediated through science, tech-
nology and technical expertise. By elaborating upon these theoretical and nor-
mative concerns, I hope to explicate the thoughts which have been an under-
current throughout my thesis work. 
Andrew Feenberg’s engagement with the STS field is in line with the work initi-
ated by his former mentor, Herbert Marcuse. Unlike most of the other mem-
bers of the Frankfurt School, possibly with the exception of Walter Benjamin, 
Marcuse showed a sustained interest in technology. Furthermore, Marcuse was 
at one point crowned as the guru of the May 1968 student movement. When 
the other members of the Frankfurt School withdrew from political life, Mar-
cuse gave his, albeit qualified, support to the protesters. In short, Marcuse’s 
thinking provides a good starting point for a critical theory of technology. The 
objective of such a research programme, Feenberg says, is to lend support to 
what he calls ‘democratic rationalization’. By this he means user-interventions 
which challenge the undemocratic power structures embedded in modern tech-
nologies. He stresses the possibility for individuals engaged in technically medi-
ated activities to actualise ambivalent potentialities suppressed by the prevailing 
technological rationality. An incomplete list of issues which are subject to con-
testation in this fashion include ecology, the quality of work and gender equal-
ity. He envisions an updated version of critical theory which can support such 
instances of collective action mobilised around new technologies. 
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In order to proceed, Feenberg argues that, the theories developed by the mem-
bers of the Frankfurt School need to be updated. A renewed critique of techno-
logical rationality must restore the idea of agency. On this point, he finds that 
the tradition of critical theory falls short. In Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, critique of technology turns into a denuncia-
tion of modernity as such. Instrumental rationality and domination are said to 
be at the very heart of modern technology. Herbert Marcuse was more hopeful 
about the possibility of putting up resistance. Still, he shared his colleagues’ 
bleak analysis about science and technology. Equally negative judgements were 
circulating at the time among conservative critics of modernity. The substanti-
vist philosophy of Martin Heidegger and the civilization critique of Jacques 
Ellul became particularly influential. They took aim at the commonsensical 
understanding of technology as a neutral tool. This point of view is flawed be-
cause it fails to see the transformative role of technology in reconfiguring sub-
jectivity and the lifeworld. Against the naive, instrumentalist viewpoint, the 
philosophers insisted on what they considered to be the substantial consequen-
ces of modern technology. The human subject can not be taken for granted as 
they have already been transformed by the technology they use. Under the in-
fluence of technology, everything and everyone becomes a resource and an 
object of technical control. Feenberg says that the members of the Frankfurt 
School provided a modified version of this civilisation critique, what he calls 
’leftist dystopism’. He is unhappy with this direction as: 
[…] absolute opposition to technology leaves no room for practical 
criticism and reform (Feenberg, 1999, p.128).  
Much the same conclusion has been drawn by Graeme Kirkpatrick. He asserts 
that an updated critique of technology inspired by critical theory must first 
overcome its romantic vestiges and its suspicion towards technology (Kirkpa-
trick, 2004, p. 14). Their respective programmes for renewing critical theory 
grant greater significance to the agency of users intervening in technological 
designs. They do so, however, in different ways. Kirkpatrick’s reasoning is in-
fluenced by American pragmatism, as is suggested by occasional references to 
John Dewey. Kirkpatrick speaks out in favour of the pragmatist point of view 
against substantivist philosophy which he finds a bad influence on the thinking 
of the Frankfurt School (Kirkpatrick, 2008, p.52). I will not dwell on this except 
to point out that Kirkpatrick’s pragmatism places him closer to constructivist 
STS than he might think. In contrast, Feenberg has more in common with the 
first generation of critical theorists in that he validates their philosophical heri-
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tage. Concurrently, however, he is more appreciative of constructivist STS 
thinking and actively encourages a rapprochement. 
Constructivism is a richly branched tree and a few words are in order about 
what it entails. Ian Hacking identifies as the core postulate of constructivism (or 
what he labels ‘constructionism’) that things which look inevitable and eternal 
could have been different, and possibly better. Hence, whether it is stated or 
not, there is a moral agenda behind insisting on the contingency of a given 
outcome (Hacking, 1999). Methodologically, constructivist researchers rely on 
empirical observations when reflecting over science and technology. This 
course of action is sometimes spoken of as ’empirical philosophy’. When sci-
ence and technology are approached through case studies, it becomes evident 
that technology can be many things and be given shifting meanings. This prov-
ides a corrective to the tendency among philosophers to contemplate technolo-
gy from the comfort of their armchairs, and, as a consequence, treat it as a sing-
le monolithic entity. Andrew Feenberg is attracted to the empirical philosophy 
of constructivism because it secures a space for users to intervene in technolo-
gy. Meaningful political work can be done on the level of individual design 
solutions. This possibility is jeopardised anew, however, if the constructivist 
argument is pushed too far. Then, the basis for its own critique disintegrates. 
Speaking of Actor-Network Theory, Feenberg warns that its anti-essentialist 
demand for permanent contestation of every totalizing discourse, down to the 
very notion of the human being, provides no basis for a positive project for 
reforming science and technology (Feenberg, 2002, p.30-32). The same concern 
has been expressed by Graeme Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick, 2008, p.106), and, 
indeed, by Ian Hacking (Hacking, 1999, p.95). Andrew Feenberg sees strengths 
and shortcomings with both substantivist philosophical reasoning and the case 
study approach prescribed by constructivist STS theory. He believes that it is 
possible to combine the best of the two worlds. A synthesis, which he labels 
‘critical constructivism’, is thinkable because of the common roots of the two 
traditions. Although not all constructivist STS scholars are aware of it, Feenberg 
argues, their perspectives largely stem from Marxist ideas (Feenberg, 2008, 
p.14). 
Indeed, there is a link between, on the one hand, the sociology of knowledge, 
and, on the other, Marxist ideology critique. It goes back to the forerunners of 
both traditions, Karl Mannheim and Georg Lukács. The two knew each other 
from having attended the same seminars in Hungary. Mannheim was influenced 
by the latter to the extent that he has been called a ’bourgeois Lukács’. Themati-
cally, of course, they address the same questions about how to differentiate, if at 
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all, between scientific truth claims and ideology (Bailey, 1994; Lichtheim, 1965, 
p.187). Various additional Marxist strands have contributed to the thinking 
which later metamorphosed into the STS field. One source of influence, descri-
bed by Gary Werskey, was the British scientific left in the 1930s. It consisted of 
a group of scientists and historians of science who began to historicize the sci-
entific revolution. The growth of science was set against the backdrop of emer-
ging, capitalist relations. In the 1970s, a new inflow of ideas came from the 
radical science movement. As a result of their political engagement, its members 
re-envisioned the history and politics of science shaping the intellectual heritage 
of the STS field (Werskey, 2007). Given these connections, it is not surprising 
to find overlaps between constructivist STS and the critical theory of technolo-
gy. A case in point is the concern with ’empirical philosophy’, which, in fact, 
was foreshadowed by the Frankfurt School. In his inaugural lecture, Max Hork-
heimer underlined that: 
[...] the philosophical questions themselves are dialectically integrated 
into the empirical scientific process; that is to say, their answers are 
to be found in the progress of substantive knowledge which also af-
fects the form. (Horkheimer, 1989, p.32) 
This methodological point is made against a common enemy of both construc-
tivist STS and critical theory, i.e. contemplative philosophy. Empirical investiga-
tion is endorsed as an antidote to the inclination of many philosophers for a 
priori reasoning. Constructivist STS and critical theory also share an aversion to 
scientism. Writers in both traditions have been unsparing in their critiques of 
commonsense beliefs in scientific truth claims. Constructivist STS shares the 
determination of critical theory to expose reified concepts. The notion of ’reifi-
cation’ was developed by Georg Lukács. It describes the process by which rece-
ived knowledge, such as scientific facts and laws, come to appear as eternally 
and universally valid. Against such perceptions, both constructivism and critical 
theory have insisted on focussing on the historical processes through which the 
facts in question are produced. Furthermore, both contend that this process is 
open-ended towards the future. The reason is that the validity of a fact or law 
depends on the intervention by the surrounding world. This leads on to an 
elevation of practice as a key consideration in writings about epistemology. 
However, although both schools appear to agree about this, the word ’practice’ 
is subject to different interpretations. When the STS scholar Annemarie Mol 
emphasises the importance of studying practices, she is advising her colleagues 
to study the physical movements, routines, instruments, and so on, of the prac-
titioners in a situated context. Conclusions about politics can follow from this 
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orientation. For instance, Mol ends her book about medical practices in a hospi-
tal by making some policy recommendations (Mol, 2002). For someone like 
Herbert Marcuse, on the other hand, practice denotes ‘class struggle’. It is in 
this practice that the line between the world and knowledge about the world or, 
putting it differently, between object and subject, is transgressed (Marcuse, 
1955). 
From this example, it must be clear that the divergences between constructivist 
STS and critical theory are at least as significant as the commonalities. What 
interests me is not their political and normative differences per se. Rather, I am 
concerned with how divergent ideas about politics arise out of their different 
epistemological positions. This touches on an issue which not only separates 
constructivism from critical theory, but also separates the different camps 
within the constructivist STS tradition. It has to do with the special status of 
social theory. Or, differently put, how to delimit the field of inquiry of the con-
structivist programme. One camp, as is exemplified by the Edinburgh School, 
singles out the natural sciences as its object of study. The truth claims of the 
natural sciences are relativised by drawing upon the toolbox of sociology, and, 
occasionally, Marxism. Researchers subscribing to this school sometimes go 
under the label of ’social constructivists’. Another camp, represented by Actor-
Network Theory (ANT), and its many variants, insists on removing the epithet 
’social’. It does so while exclaiming that the social sciences must be subjected to 
the same kind of treatment as the natural sciences have been before. Generalisa-
tions about society and other ‘social facts’ cannot be relied upon any more than 
the truth claims uttered by the natural scientists. If social theory is held off-
limits for constructivist analysis, the followers of ANT charge, then an implicit 
line will be re-established between nature and society (see the positions outlined 
in Pickering, 1992). 
This move to extend constructivist analysis to include the social sciences has 
been made under the influence of a broader, intellectual current, namely, that of 
post-structuralism. A token hereof is that the constructivist STS scholars fol-
lowing this lead assumed the same destabilising consequences for the explanato-
ry power of social theory (Zammito, 2004, p.165). Some notable thinkers asso-
ciated with post-structuralism are Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Michel 
Serres. Although their writings are distinct, a few common themes within post-
structuralist thinking can be discerned. These include a rejection of the possibili-
ties for metaphysical closure and philosophical transcendence; a denial of uni-
versal truth claims; a critique of essentialism; a suspicion towards grand narra-
tives, and, at times, an endorsement of post-humanism. That these postulates 
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clash with some core assumptions within critical theory will come as no surprise 
when recalling the origins of post-structuralism. 
This line of thought grew strong in the wake of the 1968 student uprising in 
France. Characteristic of the post-68 intellectual milieu was its aversion to He-
gelian philosophy and the Marxist currents it had inspired (Descombes, 1980). 
Another trait of this milieu was its preoccupation with totalitarianism. Such 
fears owed a lot to the Cold War rhetoric of the day. This gained in purchase 
among French intellectuals due to their personal experiences with the French 
communist party. These two aspects were wedded together, so that, bluntly put, 
the underlying cause of political totalitarianism was said to be Hegelian philoso-
phy. Allegedly, the philosophy of Hegel was corrupt due to its penchant for 
logocentric metaphysical closure. To hold the threat of totalitarianism at bay, 
identified with ‘dialectical thinking’, intellectuals had to side with the frag-
mented, the heterogeneous, the local, the multiple and the immanent. In addi-
tion to concerns with transcendence were to be relinquished. Both as a philo-
sophical idea and as a praxis, the notion of transcendence was said to end in a 
Leninist, vanguard party (Žižek, 2002; Christofferson, 2004).  
This sketchy picture of the historical break between post-structuralism and 
Hegelian Marxist philosophy requires refinement. Much of the post-structuralist 
critique was foreshadowed by Theodor Adorno. Over the years, he had grown 
increasingly weary of the Hegelian vantage point from which the ‘whole’ of 
society allegedly could be rendered transparent. In its place, he came to emphas-
ize ‘negative dialectics’. Preeminence was given here to the individual pheno-
menon rather than any generalising concept. Unlike later-day writers associated 
with post-structuralism, however, Adorno never gave up all hope of radical 
transcendence (Adorno, 1990; for an assessment: Grumley, 1989, p.183). Ador-
no’s rapprochement suggests that the distance between, for instance, Actor-
Network Theory and some versions of dialectics, might be less than could have 
been expected (Söderberg & Netzén, 2010). Such ambiguities notwithstanding, 
it is clear that post-structuralism developed in opposition to Hegelian Marxist 
philosophy. My claim is that this juncture, where the common path of construc-
tivist STS and critical theory divides, gives an indication of what remains hard to 
reconcile between the two. To whatever extent the postulates of post-
structuralism have been passed down to constructivist STS, for instance, as 
regards its commitment to anti-essentialism and the notion of multiplicity, or its 
suspicion of so-called metaphysical closures, these ideas continue to ward 
against a return to dialectical thinking. In other words, we are confronted with 
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irresolvable differences between most schools of constructivist STS, including 
ANT, and the tradition of critical theory. 
For the sake of clarity, I will limit my discussion to one vital point of diver-
gence. That is, the disputed validity of the concept of ‘totality’. My choice is 
partly motivated by the importance which Georg Lukács assigned to this no-
tion. The decisive trait of Marxism, he famously declared, is the point of view of 
totality. It stands opposed to the atomist outlook of much bourgeois thinking 
(Lukács, 2000, p.27). Moreover, Martin Jay has argued that if there is any com-
mon denominator drawing together the heterogeneous bunch of authors col-
lected under ‘post-structuralism’, it is their animosity towards this concept (Jay, 
1984, p.515). I look more closely at this debate in my article ‘Reconstructivism 
versus critical theory’. There I adopt a theoretical approach which investigates 
how the ‘social whole of commodity relations’ influenced the design of Ronja. 
In doing so, I relate to Adorno’s defence of critical theory against empiricist 
sociology. In the latter tradition, concepts which cannot be verified through 
empirical research tend to be dismissed as speculative ‘metaphysics’. Totality is 
precisely such a concept. And yet, Adorno contended, sociology cannot reject it 
without losing some of its explanatory power (Adorno, 1977, p.12). My discus-
sion below is not, however, primarily concerned with the analytical merits of 
maintaining or abandoning the philosophical idea about a social whole. Instead, 
what I will discuss is how such a decision leads to contrasting political strate-
gies. 
The trend in academia and among activists during recent decades has been to 
adopt an epistemology voided from any reference to the concept of ‘totality’. 
Andrew Feenberg observes, for instance, that politics is no longer understood 
as ‘totalizing strategies of change’. Political action nowadays operates with more 
restricted, narrative claims (Feenberg, 1999, p. 104). He credits thinkers like 
Michel Foucault, Michel De Certeau and Bruno Latour for having led this reo-
rientation towards 'micro-politics'. It is argued that social change should be 
achieved through a plurality of local struggles. Crucially, these struggles are 
supposed to unfold in the absence of a general strategy. They must not be sub-
ject to command by parties or unions. Graeme Kirkpatrick describes the same 
development in political thinking. He does not use the word ‘micro-politics’ and 
is negative in his overall assessment of Foucault and Latour. Still, his pragmatist 
re-reading of critical theory ends in a political proposal which in some respects 
is closer to them than to the associates of the Frankfurt School (Kirkpatrick, 
2004, p.111-112). The main reason for this is that Kirkpatrick agrees with La-
tour about the superfluousness of what they consider to be ‘metaphysics’ and 
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‘social substances’ in critical theory (Kirkpatrick, 2008, p.110). Subsequently, 
Kirkpatrick sees little merit in a philosophical approach which envisions politi-
cal change on a civilisational scale. Indeed, he criticises Feenberg for engaging in 
speculations of this sort. According to Kirkpatrick, these reflections are not 
needed in order to put forward proposals for reforming science and technology 
(Kirkpatrick, 2008, p.86). Feenberg maintains that substantivist philosophy has 
something to offer to present-day activists. Like Kirkpatrick, however, he is 
disappointed over the meagre political results of the Frankfurt School and its 
totalizing opposition to technology. Both authors are attracted to the empower-
ing message which underlies the call to micro-politics. It ensures that changes 
can be made here and now, without having to take on a totality of social forces 
or waiting for the revolutionary moment. However, Feenberg also acknowledg-
es the pitfalls of micro-politics. It is hard to see how a plurality of local struggles 
can measure up to a globally co-ordinated, political adversary, such as a state or 
a corporation (Feenberg, 2002, p.71).  
Feenberg and Kirkpatrick are primarily concerned with securing a space for 
users to intervene in technology. A third perspective is provided by Simon 
Cooper who criticizes Feenberg for placing undue stress on the autonomous 
capacity of the social actor. Simon Cooper locates himself closer to the substan-
tivist end of the spectrum. He draws upon Martin Heidegger in order to shift 
the burden of proof. Instead of speaking about the agency of the user, he fo-
cuses on how this subject position has always-already been transformed by the 
development of science and technology. It is for this reason that he doubts 
whether much can be achieved through a democratization of science and tech-
nology. It is thinkable, he argues, that the progress of science and technology 
will result in an inhospitable future even if the decisions have been taken demo-
cratically. He is not opposed to democratic reforms of science and technology. 
Rather, Cooper’s argument is that critical theory must attend to problems which 
cannot be resolved through deliberation and user participation alone (Cooper, 
2002; 2006). The problem Cooper runs into is a familiar one. When the subject 
position has been undermined in this way, no foundation remains for mounting 
resistance. Feenberg is quick to point out that Cooper fails to propose anything 
by which the current state of affairs could be improved upon (Feenberg, 2006, 
p.190).  
I find Cooper’s reasoning persuasive but also the concerns of Feenberg. Per-
haps a fresh angle on this thorny issue can be provided by referring back to 
Theodor Adorno’s defence against the accusation of defeatism. His argument 
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points to the link I am trying to establish between the philosophical idea of 
totality and opposing political strategies: 
The appearance of quietism can easily arise because the difficulties of 
change naturally stand out far more clearly if one has the whole of 
society in view. They are less prominent – and this again is a kind of 
pragmatism – if they are seen as within the scope of individual con-
stellations, where structural relationships appear far more moderately 
and less harshly than in a theory of social structure. (Adorno, 2000, 
p.28). 
Theodor Adorno went on, asserting that a praxis which relates to the total 
structure of society, and not merely to isolated social phenomena, would require 
a theory of society as a whole. The opposite standpoint is upheld by those con-
structivist STS approaches which subscribe to post-structuralism. They profess 
that the isolated social phenomenon – the individual case study – is all there is. 
This procedure was once dubbed ‘methodological internalism’ by Karin Knorr-
Cetina and Michael Mulkay. It is exemplified by the early laboratory studies 
which championed a methodological approach exclusively focusing on local 
practices (Knorr-Cetina & Mulkay, 1983; for criticism: Doing, 2007). Unsurpri-
singly, when reflection over structural relationships has been suspended in this 
way, agency and micro-politics show up everywhere. According to the same line 
of thought, what confines the autonomous capacity of social actors is not struc-
tures, but rather writings where the existence of these underlying structures are 
affirmed. It is along these lines that an older generation of activist-minded STS 
scholars was taken to task by a row of constructivist writers. A case in point is 
Marc Berg’s polemic against human-computer interactive design, something I 
look at more closely in my article on misuser inventions. As Luc Boltanski has 
shown in a different context, the turn towards empirical, micro-sociological 
investigations of practitioners themselves was a general trend in the 1980s. It 
emerged as a revolt against an earlier generation of sociologist-critics who had 
acted as omniscient sages vis-à-vis their informants. In hindsight, the trend of 
placing the focus exclusively on the informants’ own experiences has turned out 
to be something of a political dead-end. Boltanski argues that an effective criti-
que of society needs to be anchored in the perspectives of the actors but must 
then adopt an overarching point of view which transcends their restricted hori-
zon (Boltanski, 2009, p.46, 58). 
It is not unwarranted to be concerned that a political outlook starting with the 
philosophical idea of ‘totality’ will end up in defeatism. My conclusion is that 
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this risk must be accepted nonetheless. As is suggested from the discussion 
above, the alternative can be even worse. Furthermore, I believe that the ideas 
of the Frankfurt School can be interpreted in such a way that the risk for defeat-
ism is limited. It depends on where one chooses to place the emphasis. Unsur-
prisingly, in the field of the critical theory of technology, the emphasis has been 
on how science and technology were discussed by the first generation of critical 
theorists. A key reference is Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Its totalizing civilization critique can be read as converging on Heidegger’s 
dreary judgement over modernity. Indeed, many have arrived at such an as-
sessment, also thinkers who otherwise sympathize with the Frankfurt School. It 
would be too large an undertaking to go through the critical reception of Dialec-
tic of Enlightenment. Let it suffice to say that I agree with an interpretation which 
offers the benefit of doubt to Horkheimer and Adorno by stressing their reason 
for writing in the first place, i.e. to make an appeal for social change (Zuider-
vaart, 2007). This is not an interpretation advanced by any of the three critical 
theorists discussed here – Simon Cooper, Andrew Feenberg and Graeme Kirk-
patrick. They differ in their assessment of the heritage of substantivist philoso-
phy. The first two appreciate the contribution of Heidegger’s phenomenology 
to critical theory, while the third writer wishes it away. All three of them, how-
ever, devote a substantial amount of space to Heidegger, while Horkheimer and 
Adorno are only ever mentioned in passing. None of them deal in any great 
detail with the differences between the German philosopher and his Marxist 
contemporaries. One would think that Horkheimer and Adorno deserve a place 
of their own in a reinvented critical theory of technology. When it comes to 
Herbert Marcuse’s version of critical theory, it makes more sense to treat it as 
an outgrowth of Heidegger’s phenomenology. After all, Marcuse used to be a 
student of Heidegger (Feenberg, 2005).  
If one adopts a version of critical theory analogous to Heidegger’s contempla-
tive critique of modernity, then there is a clear need for modifying that picture 
with a more empirically grounded approach to the study of science and tech-
nology. The case study approach prescribed by constructivist STS offers a cor-
rective. Another candidate might be the down-to-earth outlook of American 
pragmatism. A third option would be to declare, with Marcuse, that now when 
the writings of the young Marx and their Hegelian roots have become known to 
us, we have no need for Heidegger anymore. This is the position developed by 
John Abromeit. He argues that Marcuse later in life succeeded in breaking free 
from the influence of Heidegger. If we are to believe John Abromeit, the ma-
ture works of Marcuse draw exclusively from Marx and Hegel (Abromeit, 2010). 
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I have nothing to add to the philological aspects of this debate. I do see, how-
ever, advantages with choosing the latter path when developing a critical theory 
of technology. Such an approach could focus on the epistemological and me-
thodological reflections handed down to us by the Frankfurt School. These 
ideas could then be applied to contemporary studies of science and technology. 
A major issue in these texts is how the particular and material relates to the 
general and conceptual. In this balancing act, Adorno came out in defence of 
the richness of life which overspills the concepts that try to grasp it. This sug-
gests, in other words, that in-depth, theoretical reflection must be conducted 
through empirical investigations. Depending on where one looks, the legacy of 
the Frankfurt School can just as well point to meticulously conducted case stu-
dies and surveys (Jay, 1974).  
To sum up the argument so far, the current thesis aligns itself with a handful of 
writers who engage with the STS literature from the point of view of critical 
theory. Their individual differences remain to be worked out in detail, as do 
their respective stances towards the hitherto dominant branch of constructivist 
STS. Critical theory and constructivist STS have the same, historical roots. This 
can be seen from their shared interest in epistemological questions, their com-
mitment to empirical philosophy, their critique of reified concepts and their 
focus on practice rather than contemplation. Nonetheless, I suspect that the 
dialectical thinking of the former and the post-structuralist influences of the 
latter cannot be easily accommodated within the same programme of research. 
This claim was developed by focussing on a sticking point central to the Hege-
lian Marxist tradition, namely: the concept of totality. I argue that this concept is 
irreconcilable with the core tenets of constructivist STS. This is due to the pre-
ference of constructivists for methodological internalism, an emphasis on mul-
tiplicity over wholeness and adherence to a flat/immanent ontology. In this 
thesis, I have tried to avoid these difficulties by looking for inspiration closer to 
the historical roots of critical theory. That is to say, closer to the Hegelian Marx-
ist tradition, including some social constructivist camps within the STS field, 
such as the Edinburgh School and the social shaping of technology. My com-
parison has been chiefly concerned with the opposing, political strategies im-
plied by these different epistemological stances. Much of it comes down to a 
question of the level of autonomy of the social actor. In constructivist STS, the 
capacity of users to intervene in science and technology is emphasized. The 
autonomous capacity of social actors looks more circumscribed in a version of 
critical theory which privileges the notion of a ‘social whole’. The latter outlook 
is attentive to the always-already constituted subject position of the user. Al-
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though the risk of defeatism is a real one, the risks with yielding all aspirations 
for transcendence are equally grave. Reflecting over how agency relates to the 
total structure of society is not to invalidate political engagement. On the con-
trary, it is a precondition for designing interventions capable of making a real 
difference. 
 
Methodological Reflections Concerning Hackers 
I shall now elaborate upon the theoretical perspectives outlined above in rela-
tion to the case of hackers. Philosophical reflection has come into play for me 
already through the initial decision of what to investigate. I decided to study 
hackers, and, in particular, those hackers who are building hardware equipment, 
in the belief that their practices offer an opportunity for investigating how anta-
gonistic, political conflicts are mediated through technology and technical ex-
pertise. In making this argument, I have been inspired by the methodological 
pointers provided by the first generation of critical theorists. In particular, I 
draw on Adorno’s idea of investigating a subject through a combination of 
immanent and transcendent critique. Immanent critique works from within the 
norms and standards of a given subject. In the case of hackers, their self-
understanding and worldviews are taken as the starting point for analysis. The 
investigation then proceeds by exploring the internal contradictions of these 
accounts. Thereby the immanent critique is already in the process of transcend-
ing the limits of its object of study, i.e. the ideas of hackers. The investigation 
moves on to look at the conditions which the existence of a hacker culture 
presupposes. In a transcendent critique, hackers are studied from the point of 
view of a ‘social whole’ against which, and in relation to which, their ideas and 
practices are played out. Adorno’s advice is that an analysis should proceed by 
alternating between immanent and transcendent methods (Adorno, 1995, p.31-
33).  
Indeed, it is an over-reliance on one of the two sides of critique which has led 
to my dissatisfaction with much of the existing literature on hackers. Some 
accounts go astray by taking the categorizations of hackers as givens. This is 
commonplace in descriptive works about the free software movement written 
by scholars who sympathise with its causes. The main problem with such work 
is that by failing to reflect theoretically over the self-descriptions of hackers, the 
scholars are unable to see much further than their informants. The problems 
start already with under-theorized definitions of the ‘hacker’. In public life to-
day, the hacker is firstly associated with computer crime and intrusion. This 
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picture is contested by many hackers for whom the word designates a creative 
attitude to technology. To them, hacking is more or less synonymous with free 
software development. However, as I write in the Science as Culture article, the 
counter-narrative of some hackers is no more reliable than the tales told in the 
media. The negative image assigned to the figure of the ‘hacker’ in the media is 
here ascribed to the ‘cracker’ and ‘script-kiddie’ instead.  
It is for this reason I opt for a tentative and inclusive definition where ‘hacker’ 
applies to a broad range of cultural phenomena. As was previously discussed, I 
follow Christopher Kelty in striving for a definition which is sufficiently open-
ended to include adjacent activities belonging to the same collective, such as the 
movement around file sharing, the activists building wireless computer net-
works, and open hardware developers. What might be lost in precision with this 
more inclusive definition will hopefully be gained by the fact that it does not 
divide up activities which are related to each other. For instance, the act of 
writing 'benevolent' free software code and the act of writing ‘malicious’ crack-
ing tools. Indeed, my key point in the Science as Culture article is that this division 
between benevolent and malicious uses of technology should not be allowed to 
delimit the scope of the inquiry in advance. Not to be caught inside given 
boundaries, the scholar must adopt a perspective which overarches the 
worldviews and self-understandings of the hackers. 
Then again, examples abound where the testimonies of hackers are confuted 
from an elevated, theoretical horizon. Some issues which have disturbed aca-
demic commentators include the predominance of male hackers, a penchant for 
liberal or libertarian worldviews and a faith in technological determinism. In my 
article for New Media & Society, I take issue with the negative estimations of the 
technological determinism of hackers. I too find that technological determinist 
explanations of social change can be found wanting. What I remain uncon-
vinced about, however, is the connection repeatedly drawn in the academic 
literature, between an erroneous belief in technological determinism and anti-
democratic, entrenched power relations. I started to have doubts after I had 
witnessed one episode in the Swedish media debate about file sharing. Spokes-
persons for the Swedish Pirate Party as well as many of its supporters in the 
‘blogosphere’ have frequently referred to the inevitability of technological 
change (Andersson, 2010). When new laws on intellectual property have been 
passed by parliament, proponents of file sharing argue defiantly that these laws 
will soon be circumvented thanks to the development of information technolo-
gy and the free flow of information. In reaction to such declarations of faith in 
technological determinism, the representatives of the culture industry came out 
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in defense of the possibility of politics to overcome the imperative of technolo-
gical necessity. Leaving aside the comic qualities of such exchanges, they suggest 
that academic critics have been wrong in ascribing an underdog position to 
whoever is challenging technological deterministic viewpoints. This is not to say 
that the objections against the male chauvinism, liberal ideology or technologi-
cal utopianism of hackers are ill-founded. Such depictions, however, tend to be 
rather predictable. What risks being foreclosed is a sensitivity for how estab-
lished meanings are subverted in the practices of hackers. As a consequence, the 
contradictory and possibly emancipatory potential of hacking is left unexplored. 
More can be learned if the hackers are judged on their own terms. 
Although Gabriella Coleman and Alex Golub do not refer to immanent and 
transcendent critique, their work offers a good example of the kind of approach 
I have in mind. They have studied the liberal/libertarian convictions of hackers 
without buying into this worldview or foreclosing its potentialities. Coleman 
and Golub argue that the contradictory tendencies within liberalism are selec-
tively adopted by groups of hackers. Hence, it is by no means automatic that 
libertarian hackers will end up in league with the status quo. On the contrary, the 
liberalism of hackers is often on collision course with existing, liberal societies 
(Coleman & Golub, 2008). This argument attests to a general feature of hacker 
politics, namely: the extent to which it is ‘under-determined’. Another indication 
of the same thing is that both the political left and right are in two minds about 
what to make of free software licenses or file sharing. To be honest about my 
own allegiances, I am sympathetic to the ideas expressed by hackers in relation 
to, for instance, their demands for free access to information. However, my 
stance towards them resembles Theodor Roszak’s when he positioned himself 
vis-à-vis the 1960s counterculture. In the opening chapter of his pioneering 
study, he felt obliged to defend his undertaking against anticipated criticism. 
The counterculture is not the best thing we could have wished for, he conceded, 
but it is what we have left to work with (Roszak, 1996 [1969]). This statement is 
no less pertinent for hackers today. While the influence of the radical ideas of 
the 1960s is steadily receding, a new kind of political engagement is mounting 
around hacking. The contradictory potentialities of hackers’ ideas and practices 
need to be examined, if only because they may be the only thing we will have to 
work with in future. A theoretical and methodological approach is therefore 
called for which stays alert to the ambiguities of hacker politics without becom-
ing subservient to its goals. It can be found, I believe, in the dictum of combin-
ing an immanent critique with a transcendent critique. This, in turn, points in 
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the direction of combining philosophical reflection with empirical investiga-
tions. 
The main empirical work in this thesis is my study of the Ronja project. This 
case study is based on a six-month period of fieldwork in the Czech Republic. 
When I arrived in Prague in autumn 2008, I discovered that the project was in 
decline. My hope of following practitioners when they were building Ronja 
machines was thwarted. Instead, most of my work consisted in tracing the con-
nections between the people that had been involved in the project. In total, I 
interviewed twenty-one of the developers and users of Ronja. Most of the inter-
views lasted for about two hours. The main developer of Ronja and the leader 
of the competing project, Crusader, were interviewed on more than one occa-
sion. I held my interviews with developers and users not only in the Czech 
Republic but also in Slovakia, Sweden, Holland and Switzerland. Using Skype I 
also interviewed a developer in India. In addition to my interview material, I 
gathered information about the project through web-based mailing lists, discus-
sion forums and homepages. Fortunately, the construction manual for the offi-
cial Ronja design has been made available in English. I have not been as fortu-
nate with the documentation connected to unofficial and modified versions of 
Ronja which have circulated in the Czech wireless network community. Like-
wise, with few exceptions, the discussions which have taken place over the 
Internet concerning Ronja have been in Czech and Slovak. Reading these texts 
has been time consuming, given my rudimentary grasp of the Czech language, 
and this has prevented me from charting everything that has been going on. 
However, combining my interview material with the significant amount of writ-
ten documentation I have been able to decipher, I have managed to derive a 
fairly comprehensive picture of the rise and fall of the Ronja project. 
Some words need to be said about the discrepancy existing between my method 
of choice, and the argument I’m attempting to advance through this case study. 
A central claim of mine is that Ronja technology has been shaped by forces 
stretching beyond the builders and users of the technology and their immediate 
circumstances. To be more precise, the course of the Ronja project was influ-
enced by the social whole of commodity relations. Market forces have inter-
vened both in the design of the technology, and in the lives of its users and 
producers alike. This claim is contrary to Michel Callon’s idea about the per-
formativity of markets (Callon, 1998). He believes that markets are performed 
locally. This idea resonates with the dictum of ‘methodological internalism’ 
discussed above. It affirms the sovereignty of the locally emergent over any 
'social whole'. Arguments to this effect are typically advanced through case 
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studies. This choice of method corresponds with the content of the argument. 
Scholars who remain unconvinced about the ideas of Callon et. al. remain as 
consistent when they turn to statistics and comparative methods to make con-
testing claims. Not so when I adopt a case study arguing against the idea of the 
performativity of markets. I am prepared to introduce a mismatch between the 
method I draw upon and the claims I make. The weight of my argument is 
carried by the observations made at the site of investigation. But my argument 
is that these observations retain their meaning only through the mediation of a 
web of social relations framing the individual site of the case study.  
The classic objection against the case study method applies to me in full, since, 
unlike my interlocutors, I have accepted some of the premises behind that criti-
que. Joseph Pitt formulates this objection by talking about the two shortcom-
ings of case study methods. The first shortcoming emerges when the case has 
been selected for the sake of exemplifying a philosophical point. In this in-
stance, these philosophical claims will not be sufficiently supported. It could be 
argued, says Pitt, that the empirical data was collected with this purpose in 
mind. When the case study instead is taken as the starting point of the inquiry, 
problems arise in relation to the second major shortcoming. No philosophical 
direction will emerge out of such a chaotic mass of data (Pitt, 2001). It is the 
first shortcoming identified by Joseph Pitt which my argument is at risk of fall-
ing victim to.  
A well-known defence of case study methodology has been advanced by Bent 
Flyvbjerg. Bringing him up here is relevant also because his defence is part of a 
larger programme for making social science matter which I am in accord with. 
His goal is to heighten the political relevance of sociological research. This 
requires that sociology abandon the ideals of the natural sciences and concen-
trate on what is specific about the social sciences. This leads Flyvbjerg to argue 
for research based on case studies focussing on the concerns of different groups 
and publics, value judgements and power relations. Crucially, Flyvbjerg ac-
knowledges, and this resonates with my argument above, that the case study 
approach needs to incorporate an external measuring rod in relation to which 
the practitioners can be assessed (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p.94). In light of Flyvbjerg’s 
defence of the case study method, I readily confess that my initial assumptions 
were to some extent mirrored in my empirical findings. Anything else would be 
inconceivable. The pressing question is rather whether or not the resistances I 
encountered during my study were able to modify my initial agenda and preju-
dices. This is a question, however, which must be posed with equal vigour to 
any other empirical research method. Flyvbjerg argues compellingly that the 
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case study is not per se any more or less subjective than a systematic testing of 
hypotheses through large surveys and statistics. The prestige of the latter hangs 
together with the ideal of prediction, emulating the methods of the natural 
sciences. Since that ideal has been shown to be something of a pipe dream, a 
more realistic aspiration would be to initiate learning processes. In this way the 
case study can be privileged as didactics has demonstrated the centrality of cases 
for the capacity of humans to learn.  
Flyvbjerg’s argument has bearing on my study of the Ronja project. Although, 
in the end, I claim to have confirmed many of my initial suppositions through 
my case study, I encountered things along the way which I could not have antic-
ipated in advance. One example hereof is that the motives of the contesting 
groups of the Ronja community were much more multi-faceted than I had 
imagined. When following the debates on the mailing lists from Sweden, the 
dividing lines seemed to be rather clear-cut between, on the one hand, a group 
of politically motivated idealists, and, on the other, a group of pragmatically 
minded entrepreneurs. What I found in the Czech Republic was that the two 
main parties subscribed to rather similar political ideas. These ideas were frac-
tured, however, by alternative approaches to disseminating the invention among 
ordinary users. From this experience they drew different conclusions about the 
possibility of achieving political goals through developing new technology. That 
a learning process was initiated through my case study is something I think can 
be seen from the differences in style between the two theoretical articles. The 
one about misuser invention was written before and the one about the technol-
ogical determinism of hackers was written after I had completed my field work 
in the Czech Republic. 
One might still respond to Flyvbjerg by asking what the relevance of learning 
through case studies is to others than those directly involved. His answer is that 
it could be of great importance, depending on how the case study is located in 
relation to general problems in the field in question. One example hereof is 
what he calls a ‘critical case study’. Critical case studies deliberately seek out the 
toughest possible case for confirming or refuting some research question. Such 
a case should permit deductions of the type: ‘If this claim is valid/invalid in this 
case, then it applies to all/no cases’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.230). Case selection is 
thus made to bear the full weight of Flyvbjerg's defence of the relevance of the 
case study approach. It is an argument I sympathise with, since it stresses the 
importance of the framing of the case and the theoretical reflections which 
necessarily have preceded the study. This is even more accentuated when Flyvb-
jerg moves on to discuss what he calls ‘paradigmatic cases’. These are cases 
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which serve to highlight general features and trends in society. By way of illu-
stration, he discusses how Michel Foucault extrapolated from the notion of the 
Panopticon to say something about society at large. Flyvbjerg acknowledges 
that the criteria for selecting paradigmatic cases are hard to pin down, as an 
element of personal intuition or sociological imagination will always be called 
for. He believes that an apt choice of case can nonetheless be recognised by 
peers (Flyvbjerg, 2006). What he is striving for with the notion of 'paradigmatic 
cases' is I believe possible to combine with Adorno's insistence that sociologists 
must study the essential. By this Adorno meant historically produced relations 
which manifest themselves in the movements of society as a whole (Adorno, 
2000, p.25). 
My determination to study the Ronja project, which, after all, required me to 
seek additional funding for my doctoral research and to learn how to read 
Czech, arose out of an intuition that this was a critical case, and, perhaps even a 
paradigmatic one. It was critical in the strict sense that it seemed to challenge 
the hypothesis I wanted to explore. A quick glance at Ronja suggested a locally 
emergent technology leading to the creation of a small market for a new device. 
During the initial years the Ronja project remained isolated primarily due to the 
fact that all the documentation and the discussions were in Czech. Furthermore, 
the ambition of designing the technology with locally available resources and 
skills was a guiding ambition of the project. The intended local self-sufficiency 
of the project was coupled with a strong desire to create a free space indepen-
dent of established institutions, such as funding agencies and government au-
thorities.  
This last ambition is critical to the overall concerns of my thesis as I have been 
interested to investigate how the Czech wireless network community, though 
formally floating outside any bureaucratic control structures, is nonetheless 
enmeshed in a globally encompassing and historically developed 'form', that is: 
the commodity form. In other words, I wanted to reveal the always-already 
constituted subject position of Czech wifi entrepreneurs overlaying their indi-
vidual views and aspirations. By definition, my analytical concerns could not be 
expected to show up in the statements of the actors themselves. What I found 
in the Ronja case, however, was that the community had been split in half over 
the question of the limits of institutional entrepreneurship. More specifically, it 
was disputed whether or not it was a viable, political strategy to redesign the 
invention into a full-fledged, consumer good. Thanks to this controversy, the 
spotlight was placed on the form as opposed to the content of the marketable 
product. Thus, I was able to collect testimony pointing to how the design of the 
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technology had been streamlined according to the requirements of the com-
modity form.  
It is in this respect that the case in question can deserve the label ‘paradigmatic’. 
The Ronja project foreshadowed the growth of a broader global movement 
around open hardware design which has just begun to emerge in recent years. 
This movement seems to be indicative of a more general trend, where the de-
velopment of technology is taking place ‘outside’ firms and professions. It then 
becomes essential, in Adorno’s sense of the word, to examine how the seeming-
ly autonomous activities of users and entrepreneurs are nonetheless gravitating 
towards the circulation of new kinds of commodities and ways of making a 
living in a market economy. Ultimately, with this case study I hope to have 
given further weight to the argument that social analysis needs to incorporate an 
awareness of a social whole of commodity relations. It points to the restricted 
autonomy and self-understanding of social actors, and, by extension, the limits 
of the case study approach. 
 
Structure of Thesis 
This thesis consists of four articles, all of which deal with hackers in one way or 
another. The first article, ‘Determining social change’, commences by highlight-
ing the technological deterministic viewpoints of many hackers and sometimes, 
of scholars studying hackers. Since I also subscribed to this position when I 
embarked on my research, this article can be said to trace my own intellectual 
development. Under the influence of constructivist theory, I have been sensi-
tized to the politically negotiated constructions underlying claims about ‘nature’ 
and ‘necessity’. While becoming acquainted with this argument, however, I 
remembered why I had been attracted to the slogan of many hackers that ‘in-
formation wants to be free’ in the first place. It asserted that the demands for 
free access to information were destined to prevail despite the entrenched polit-
ical and economic forces working against such a development. It was for this 
reason that I began to question some of the key assumptions behind the aca-
demic debunking of technological determinism. For example, the assumption 
that subscription to a technological determinist viewpoint is incompatible with a 
genuine concern for democratic involvement. Having recently acquired the 
constructivist toolbox, I decided to apply it to this last vestige of necessity. My 
basic proposition, then, was as follow: the meaning of deterministic explana-
tions is under-determined too. What needs to be explained is why the link be-
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tween technological determinism and undemocratic attitudes continues to be 
taken for granted. I propose that there are political reasons for this.  
My claim can be illustrated with reference to the work of John Law. In a recent 
paper, Law (2009) developed a defence of the kind of intellectual position that I 
am implicitly questioning in my article about determinism. He is dedicated to 
the task of deconstructing grand narratives about science (technological deter-
minism, universally valid truth claims and so on). He abstains, however, from 
taking sides in any of the narratives he has deconstructed. That would presuma-
bly lead to a new metaphysical closure. John Law insists that his intellectual 
position is nevertheless progressive and relevant. The condition for making that 
claim is that the link between determinacy and undemocratic values is being 
kept fixed. An unremitting critique of grand narratives will therefore necessarily 
land on the side of democracy, without asking for any further political commit-
ments on the part of the science studies scholar (Law, 2009). The counter-claim, 
that narratives about technological determinism are under-determined, points us 
in the opposite direction. In order to be politically relevant, science studies 
scholars must take sides and contribute to some grand narratives. By having 
turned constructivism upon itself in this way, I have also turned it upon myself, 
and demonstrated how much of my thinking nowadays is indebted to this mode 
of reasoning.  
To be more specific about the content of the New Media & Society article. My 
argument is advanced by making a historical comparison between hackers and 
the labour movement. In both cases, ideas about technological necessity have 
been incorporated into their demands for democratic reforms. It is not only 
technocratic policy makers, then, but grassroots activists too, who may claim 
the apolitical, neutral high-ground in public debates. If my argument went no 
further than this, however, it would lead only to a celebration of the capacity of 
the ‘underdogs’ to subvert and appropriate dominant meanings. What I want to 
highlight is rather the limits for thematizing political conflicts in a society preoc-
cupied with technical problem solving and consensus building. On the one 
hand, this rhetorical strategy is effectively deployed by hackers, while, on the 
other hand, unknown horizons have been foreclosed by the near impossibility 
of articulating politics in outright, antagonistic terms.  
Similar concerns infuse my second article, ‘Misuser invention and the invention 
of the misuser: Hackers, crackers and file sharers’, which is published in Science 
as Culture. There I refer to the work of Chantal Mouffe, Slavoj Žižek and Jac-
ques Rancière, among others, who have returned to the conservative legal scho-
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lar Carl Schmitt in search of an alternative to the self-understanding of liberal 
and pluralistic societies. A post-political situation is upon us, they argue in their 
own distinctive ways, because of a general refusal in society to recognise anta-
gonistic conflicts. My contribution in the article consists in bringing this con-
cern with post-politics into contact with current discussions about user-centred 
innovation and lay expertise. I direct attention to aspects of user involvement in 
technology which have been insufficiently researched and where antagonism 
stands out, for instance, lay expertise in cryptography. Examples like this one 
are tested against the theoretical challenge to the concept of antagonism devel-
oped by Marc Berg and other like-minded, constructivist STS scholars. Taking a 
cue from what is known as the ‘interest debate’, Berg questions the plausibility 
of speaking about antagonistic relations between workers and managers in a 
factory. This idea has become outdated, he claims, because the identities and 
interests of the antagonists have been rendered fluid and contingent by the 
introduction of new technology. No antagonists can be discerned in the perpe-
tual reconfiguration of human-machine hybrids.  
As should be clear from my reasoning above, I do not share the post-
structuralist and post-humanist premises behind Berg’s reasoning. Still, his ob-
jection contains an important element of truth. Technology is not merely sup-
pressing existing conflicts of interest. Technology can be developed in such a 
way that potential conflicts of interest are anticipated and dispersed before they 
have been thematized as such and come to existence. However, if there are no 
stable identities or interests against which antagonistic struggles are being played 
out, how can one tell if there is a conflict of interest at all? It is at this point I 
find it useful to return to Carl Schmitt. The punitive side of law enforcement 
gives a clear signal of an asymmetrical power relation and interests in conflict. 
This is not to say, however, that legal sanctions offer any immediate access to 
the existence of antagonistic relations. Antagonism will only be seen if one first 
refuses to let the legal system decide in advance who is the user and who is the 
misuser. It is for this reason I insist that these categorisations must not be taken 
as received knowledge. If they are, studies of user-centred invention will pro-
ceed according to a ‘container theory’ approach, where users who are defying 
the law are discussed in a completely different fashion to those who are not. In 
this way, the presence of antagonistic relations disappears from view once again. 
Indeed, this is exactly how hackers, crackers and file sharers have been divided 
up in much of the academic literature, even though these people often use the 
same programming tools and belong to the same recursive public. 
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The third and the fourth articles collected in this volume are based on my study 
of the Ronja project in the Czech Republic. Here too, my concern is to defend 
an epistemology which renders visible aspects of user involvement and lay ex-
pertise. I believe that these aspects tend to be missed out in the two dominant 
theoretical approaches, innovation studies and constructivist STS. The third 
article, ‘Free space optics in the Czech wireless community’, accepted for publi-
cation in Science, Technology and Human Values, engages in a polemic against inno-
vation studies. My argument emerges out of a critique which constructivist STS 
scholars have already launched against work in the innovation studies tradition. 
Briefly stated, the typical study of user-centred innovation is conceived in rela-
tion to the concerns of the firm benefiting from the activity of the users. Subse-
quently, these studies tend to be framed by an impoverished understanding of 
the participants as users/consumers with ready-made, fixed needs. The underly-
ing assumption is that the incentive for users to innovate stems from the fact 
that their needs have not yet been satisfied by the existing products on the mar-
ket. What is missing from this is the generative and dynamic aspects of 
needs/desires. Such an objection can be made from the position exemplified by 
Marc Berg above. Needs, just like interests, should be seen as contingent mo-
ments in an ever-changing network of human/machine hybrids. I reach a simi-
lar conclusion but building on social movement theory instead.  
I argue that technical inventions should be seen as by-products of the formation 
of a collective, political subject. When the process is framed in this fashion, the 
inquiry comes to centre on the processes of meaning creation and the field of 
the ‘social’. It is at these levels of abstraction that one can make sense of the 
generative and dynamic aspects of user communities. The relevance of a social 
movement perspective for understanding user-centred innovation is suggested 
by the Ronja case. The political aspirations of the main developers were consti-
tutive of the community, and, subsequently, the inventions stemming from it. 
For certain, I also found many involved – perhaps a majority – who had built 
Ronja machines merely to get cheap and fast connectivity, and for whom the 
politically charged aspects of the project leader appeared vacuous. These indi-
viduals seemed to comply well with the vision of the user found in a typical 
innovation studies article. In my article, I argue that the centrality which these 
people ascribe to technical functionality, needs satisfaction and price were not 
common to all users. In part, it was due to the failure of one group within the 
community to mobilise the remaining users in support of the political vision of 
freely shared, open hardware. This partially explains why the practice of sharing 
hardware designs between developers could not be maintained. This contri-
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buted to a stalemate in the development process and the dissolution of the 
group. In hindsight, performance and price appear as crucial factors shaping the 
fate of the Ronja project, while the other rationales for developing the technol-
ogy have largely failed to leave their mark.  
The final article, ‘Reconstructivism versus critical theory’, has been published in 
Social Epistemology. My focus here is on users as they have been conceived in 
constructivist STS. I argue that activism and entrepreneurship in the Czech 
wireless network community cannot be adequately framed as a locally emergent 
and agency-driven phenomenon. A fuller account would have to include EU 
regulations on competition, state allocation of frequencies for wifi traffic, the 
global supply chain of consumer electronics, the expansion of the higher educa-
tion system, and so on. Crucially, these entities are not just ‘scaled-up networks’ 
as Bruno Latour would have us believe (Latour, 1983). My counter argument is 
that it is insufficient to follow material connections alone in this fashion. These 
empirically observable traces must be seen as folded into historically developed 
forms which constitute reality on multiple levels of abstraction (cf. Cooper, 
2002). Asserting this is not to dispute the validity of the case study approach. I 
have chosen to address the Ronja project because it brings into relief a deviant 
case compared to how technologically advanced hardware equipment is usually 
developed, i.e. by professionals working for firms or universities. Hence, the 
Ronja project is a useful case for highlighting the importance of the ‘social 
whole’ of commodity and wage labour relations in shaping the design of tech-
nology. Such an analysis could not have been made without the theoretical 
concepts which I mobilize and defend in my study. 
The four articles collected in this volume may also be seen as groundwork for 
studies I am interested in pursuing in the future. The Ronja project was a fore-
runner of a now rapidly emerging movement concerned with open hardware 
development. Several attempts are underway to create a definition of ‘open 
hardware’ and specify what kind of legal protection such projects will need. The 
ambition is to guarantee the same freedoms of distributing, examining and 
modifying hardware products as is already the case with free software. Although 
the definitions and legal specificities remain vague, several open hardware 
projects are gaining momentum. Currently, I am investigating the development 
of an open source 3D-printer known as Rep-rap. This project was initiated in 
2004 and global interest in it has rapidly escalated in the last two years. At the 
moment there are more than 3000 participants around the world building and 
experimenting with this machine. The printer extrudes plastic instead of ink and 
thus ’prints’ physical objects. The aim of the project is to design the machine in 
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such a way that it can print out most of the parts required for its own replica-
tion. I am interested in studying this project because it may again be possible to 
consider critical and paradigmatic in the rise or fall of a new open hardware 
movement. If the manufacturing process offered by a 3D-printer became widely 
available for home use, it would potentially enable a growing number of people 
to initiate and contribute to other open hardware projects. I expect to find 
many parallels between the Ronja project and the Rep-rap project. Both cases 
promise to throw light upon questions of expertise; how the division of labour 
is reintroduced between different classes of users; which design solutions can 
render the technology more or less transparent and how political visions are 
either sustained or extinguished through the development of new technologies. 
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Sammanfattning 
 
Inledning och syfte 
Framgångarna för den fria mjukvarurörelsen har inspirerat åtskilliga andra att 
överta de metoder, språkbruk och synsätt som brukar förknippas med hackers. 
Bland annat håller en ny rörelse på att växa fram som ägnar sig åt att utveckla 
öppen hårdvara. En föregångare till denna rörelse var de aktivister i Tjeckien 
som under de första åren på 2000-talet byggde trådlösa nätverk. Sådan verk-
samhet pågick på många håll runt om i världen vid den här tiden. Dock utmärk-
te sig de Tjeckiska aktivisterna eftersom de hade uppfunnit en egen teknologi 
för ändamålet. Teknologin, som de döpte till Ronja, bestod i en apparat som 
använder synligt, rött ljus för att sända data. Genom att montera apparaterna på 
hustaken kunde aktivisterna koppla upp sina datorer med varandra. Under ett 
par år erbjöd Ronja den billigaste, snabbaste och mest robusta lösningen för att 
bygga trådlösa datornätverk som fanns att tillgå i Tjeckien. Utöver det behov 
som teknologin uppfyllde fanns en politisk vision bakom projektet. Utvecklarna 
hoppades att Ronja skulle bidra till spridningen av trådlösa datornätverk som 
kontrollerades av användarna själva. Målet var att motverka en allt mer statligt 
reglerad och kommersiellt driven infrastruktur för datorkommunikation. Detta 
kan stå som exempel på hur politiska ambitioner omsattes i utvecklingen av en 
teknologi. Erfarenheterna och föreställningarna hos de Tjeckiska aktivisterna är 
min utgångspunkt i avhandlingen. Dessa erbjuder en ingångsvinkel för att dis-
kutera relationen mellan teknik och politik. Syftet med avhandlingen är att un-
dersöka denna relation. En central frågeställning är vilka teoretiska begrepp som 
behövs för att synliggöra asymmetrier och antagonismer på teknologins och den 
tekniska expertisens område.  
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Teoretiska utgångspunkter 
Mina resonemang i avhandlingen hämtar inspiration från ett flertal teoretiska 
strömningar. De två skolbildningar som starkast präglat avhandlingen är kritisk 
teori och konstruktivistisk teori. Relationen mellan dessa två skolor har upptagit 
en stor del av mitt intresse under arbetets gång. Det fåtal tänkare som diskuterat 
konstruktivistiska teorier om teknik och vetenskap utifrån ett kritisk teori-
perspektiv har därför spelat en viktig roll för mig. Mest känd bland dessa är 
Andrew Feenberg. Han har förordat en sammanslagning av de två teoribild-
ningarna, något som han döpt till ”kritisk konstruktivism”. Feenberg har argu-
menterat för att en sådan korsbefruktning är möjlig tack vare att de bägge tradi-
tionerna delar ett gemensamt ursprung i Marxistisk ideologikritik. Han menar 
att detta borgar för ett likartat synsätt på flera områden. Exempelvis förespråkar 
anhängare av respektive teoribildning att filosofi ska bedrivas genom empiriska 
studier. Ordet ”empirisk filosofi” har myntats för att beskriva ett sådant tillvä-
gagångssätt. En näraliggande slutsats som delas av bägge skolorna är att vägen 
till kunskap går via praktiker och studier av dessa snarare än genom kontempla-
tion. 
I min jämförelse förutsätter jag denna samsyn för att bättre kunna fokusera på 
de skillnader som jag menar består. Även dessa skillnader kan härledas till de två 
teoribildningarnas gemensamma historia. Närmare bestämt kan de spåras till-
baks till efterdyningarna av maj 1968. En ny generation av tänkare bröt med den 
då på många håll dominerande Hegelianska och Marxistiska idétraditionen till 
vilken kritisk teori hör. Den nya tankeriktningen som tog vid sammanfattas 
ibland med termen post-strukturalism. De konstruktivistiska skolor som anslutit 
sig till denna intellektuella trend har anammat ett par antaganden som är svåra 
att förena med kritisk teori. Det skulle krävas en omfattande utläggning för att 
belägga mitt påstående. Här kommer jag att nöja mig med att lyfta fram ett enda 
filosofiskt begrepp som skiljer kritisk teori från mycket konstruktivistisk teori. 
Inom den filosofiska tradition som kritisk teori ansluter sig till står begreppet 
”totalitet” i centrum. Samtidigt är förkastandet av detta begrepp en gemensam 
nämnare för den brokiga skara av tänkare som brukar associeras med post-
strukturalism. Många konstruktivistiska teorier sluter upp bakom ett sådant 
ställningstagande. Istället föreskriver de studier som uteslutande lyfter fram 
lokalt situerade fenomen. Karin Knorr-Cetina har kallat det senare tillväga-
gångssättet för ”metodologisk internalism”. Konsekvenserna härav, både analy-
tiskt och praktiskt, är vidsträckta. För att min framställning ska vara överblick-
  61
bar begränsar jag den fortsatta diskussionen till de politiska följderna av att 
anamma alternativt överge begreppet ”totalitet”. 
Den centrala uppgiften för kritisk teori är att vägleda politiskt handlande genom 
att utveckla ideologikritik. Möjligheten att bedriva sådan kritik vilar på antagan-
det om en historiskt uppkommen, samhällelig totalitet. Det är nämligen utifrån 
denna teoretiska utblickspunkt som kritiska teoretiker gör anspråk på att kunna 
värdera de praktiker och de erfarenheter som återfinns i det platsbundna sam-
manhanget. Enligt detta synsätt ger informanternas egna verklighetsbeskriv-
ningar en otillräcklig grund för att bygga en normativ kritik på. Historiskt sedi-
menterade, strukturella ojämlikheter kan ha blivit allmänna till den grad att dessa 
strukturer inte längre är synliga för informanterna själva. Därav vikten som 
kritisk teori lägger vid att medvetandegöra de samhälleliga krafter som förmodas 
verka bakom aktörernas ryggar. Kontrasten är skarp mot förhållningssättet som 
exempelvis teoretikern Bruno Latour påbjuder. En av hans mest berömda devi-
ser är att sociologer bör ”följa aktörerna”. Med detta talesätt vill han ställa aktö-
rernas praktiker och erfarenheter i förgrunden. Även detta ideal har politiska 
förtecken. Det antas underminera övertaget som vissa grupper tillskansar sig, till 
exempel sociologer som bedriver ideologikritik, när de utger sig för representera 
någon annan eller tala utifrån en högre princip eller ett vetenskapligt sannings-
anspråk. 
Med respektive epistemologiska ställningstagande följer olika och delvis motsat-
ta idéer om vad som kan och bör göras. Inte oväntat finns det nackdelar med 
bägge synsätten. En risk med den hållning som föreskrivs av kritisk teori är att 
det leder till politisk handlingsförlamning. Om varje enskild situation överskug-
gas av en samhällelig totalitet kommer handlingsutrymmet framstå som mycket 
litet. Det är denna risk som bekymrar Andrew Feenberg. I motsvarande grad 
attraheras han av konstruktivistisk teori och det handlingsutrymme som här 
tycks öppnas upp. Ett vanligt, konstruktivistiskt argument gör gällande att till 
synes eviga och universella sanningsanspråk i själva verket vidmakthålls genom 
lokala praktiker. Implikationen härav är att förhållanden som verkar evigt rå-
dande och universellt giltiga likafullt kan upphävas genom att de lokala prakti-
kerna modifieras. Risken som jag ser med att förkasta begreppet ”totalitet” och 
ansluta sig till det senare förhållningssättet är att känslan av politisk handlings-
frihet köps alltför lättvindigt. Att teoretiskt reflektera över de strukturerande 
processer och sammanhang som begränsar aktörens utrymme står inte nödvän-
digtvis i motsättning till politiskt engagemang. Tvärtom, det kan vara en förut-
sättning för att handla verkningsfullt. 
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Detta nedslag i avhandlingens teoretiska resonemang är mycket begränsat. Inte 
desto mindre hoppas jag att det fångar ett genomgående tema i avhandlingen. 
Alla fyra artiklarna behandlar på ett eller annat sätt relationen mellan kritisk 
teori och konstruktivistisk teori. Min genomlysning av deras likheter och skill-
nader är påkallad av avhandlingens syfte, det vill säga, som ett led i diskussionen 
om vilka teoretiska begrepp som behövs för att tematisera asymmetrier och 
antagonismer på teknologins och den tekniska expertisens områden. Beroende 
på var tonvikten läggs kan arvet från kritisk teori peka mot ett empiriskt tillvä-
gagångssätt som ligger nära aktörernas praktiker och utsagor. Ett sådant för-
hållningssätt stämmer överens med insikten i konstruktivistisk teori om att 
filosofi bör bedrivas genom empiriska undersökningar. Ett närmande mellan 
kritisk teori och åtminstone en del strömningar inom konstruktivismen, till 
exempel de som arbetar i Edinburgh-skolans efterföljd, är fullt tänkbar. Dock 
finns det också djuplodande skillnader mellan kritisk teori och vissa läger inom 
den konstruktivistiska tanketraditionen. Att vara på det klara med dessa skillna-
der är viktigt eftersom de olika teoretiska utgångspunkterna leder till olika och 
delvis motstående slutsatser om vad som kan och bör göras. 
 
Empiri och metod 
Ambitionen att bedriva filosofisk reflektion genom empiriska studier ligger till 
grund för min avhandling. I min empiri tittar jag på hackers. Några ord behöver 
därför sägas om vad jag menar med ”hacker”. Termen är omstridd och det 
finns flera olika användningar i den akademiska litteraturen. Jag lutar mig här 
mot en inkluderande definition av det slag som tidigare har förordats av Chris-
topher Kelty. Han medger att det finns en stor spännvidd av idéer och praktiker 
men yrkar ändå på existensen av en förenande identitet. Den ligger inte i ut-
vecklingen av en specifik teknologi (exempelvis fri mjukvara) utan i gemen-
samma föreställningar och värderingar hos hackers. När dessa idéer kommer till 
uttryck i kollektivt politiskt handlande blir det meningsfullt att tala om dem som 
en enhetlig rörelse. Jag skiljer mig från Kelty i det att jag lägger större vikt vid de 
tekniska praktikerna. Delvis är det därför som jag väljer att tala om ”hackers” 
medan Kelty föredrar ordet ”geek” även om vi i stort sett refererar till samma 
grupp av datoranvändare. Kopplingen till tekniska praktiker behövs för att 
förklara det som är specifikt med hackers, exempelvis det starka, meritokratiska 
idealet eller föreställningen om teknikutvecklingen som en samhällsomstörtande 
och huvudsakligen positiv kraft. 
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Teknikdeterminismen som många hackers ger uttryck för har blivit till en mål-
tavla för akademisk kritik. De politiska anspråken hos hackers har även ifråga-
satts med hänvisning till dominansen av män bosatta i industrialiserade länder 
och tillhörandes ett privilegierat samhällsskikt. Dessa invändningar är inte obe-
fogade. Dock riskerar kritik av det här slaget att förbise den potential till sam-
hällelig förändring som också finns inneboende i rörelsen kring hacking. Vad jag 
efterlyser är en känsla för hur de praktiker som hackers bedriver kan förskjuta 
etablerade kategoriseringar och meningssammanhang. Jag vill hävda att denna 
möjlighet tas tillvara på ett bättre sätt i Theodor Adornos utfästelse om en 
”immanent kritik”. En sådan kritik bedömer aktörernas utsagor på deras egna 
villkor. Samtidigt strävar kritiken mot att utforska de inre motsättningarna i 
dessa utsagor. Undersökningen siktar in sig på avvikelsen mellan utsagorna och 
de faktiska praktikerna. Därmed rör sig studien bortom aktörernas egna utsagor 
och mot de bortre gränser som aktörerna förutsätter. Den immanenta kritiken 
slår över i en transcendental kritik. Här ställs aktörerna mot ett utifrån uppställt 
ramverk. Adornos poäng är att en fruktbar kritik måste växla mellan de två 
strategierna. Detta tillvägagångssätt har varit vägledande i min studie av hackers. 
Det huvudsakliga empiriska materialet i avhandlingen utgörs av min fallstudie 
av Ronja-projektet. Jag tillbringade sex månader i Tjeckien under hösten 2008. 
Tyvärr upptäckte jag när jag anlände till Prag att projektet hade gått i stå. Där-
med grusades min förhoppning om att bedriva deltagande observationer på folk 
som konstruerade sina egna Ronja-apparater. En stor del av mitt arbete bestod 
istället i att spåra upp användare och utvecklare som hade varit involverade i 
projektet i ett tidigare skede. Sammantaget gjorde jag tjugoen intervjuer i Tjecki-
en, Slovakien, Nederländerna, Sverige och Schweiz. Över Skype intervjuade jag 
ytterligare en utvecklare som var bosatt i Indien. Intervjuerna var semistrukture-
rade och varade i cirka två timmar. Utvecklaren av Ronja och ledaren för ett 
konkurrerande projekt, Crusader, träffade jag vid ett flertal tillfällen. Utöver 
intervjumaterialet fanns en stor mängd dokument om projektet tillgängliga på 
Internet. En del text fanns översatt till engelska, till exempel instruktionerna för 
hur man bygger en Ronja-apparat. På diskussionsforumen, mailinglistorna och 
webbsidorna hade projektet diskuterats flitigt på tjeckiska och slovakiska. På 
grund av mina begränsade språkkunskaper har jag sannolikt inte till fullo kunnat 
tillgodogöra mig materialet. När de skrivna dokumenten och intervjuerna läggs 
samman ger det ändå en enhetlig bild av förloppet för Ronja-projektet. 
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Artikel ett 
Den första artikeln är accepterad för publicering i New Media & Society och heter 
”Determining social change: The role of technological determinism in the col-
lective action framing of hackers”. I artikeln tittar jag närmare på de föreställ-
ningar om teknologisk determinism som cirkulerar bland hackers. Akademiker 
som skrivit om hackers har ofta reagerat negativt på dylika idéer. Inom den 
akademiska litteraturen sätts ibland likhetstecken mellan en tro på teknologisk 
determinism och apolitiska eller rent av icke-demokratiska värderingar. I denna 
artikel utforskar jag hur hackers artikulerar sin politik inifrån en sådan berättelse 
om teknologisk determinism. I all korthet är min hypotes att också påståenden 
om determinism är under-determinerade. Min argumentation grundar sig i en 
jämförelse med hur arbetarrörelsen i början på nittonhundratalet åberopade 
nödvändigheten av en historieutveckling som skulle kulminera i socialism. Från 
1960-talet och framåt växte föreställningen fram om ett antågande, post-
industriellt informationssamhälle. Denna berättelse lånade mycket av de deter-
ministiska dragen från den tidiga arbetarrörelsen. En skillnad var att myten om 
informationssamhället huvudsakligen åberopades av politiska och ekonomiska 
eliter. Framtiden som utlovades var först teknokratisk och sedan, från 1980-talet 
och framåt, allt mer marknadsliberal. När samma idé övertas av hackers idag 
kvarstår de deterministiska undertonerna. Men denna gång pekar teknologiut-
vecklingen istället mot en nödvändig framtid av öppna tekniska standarder och 
fria informationsutbyten. En slutsats som jag drar i artikeln är att akademiska 
kritiker måste vara försiktiga när de fäller omdömen om, exempelvis, föreställ-
ningar om teknologisk determinism, eftersom begreppets innebörd kan skifta. 
 
Artikel två 
Den efterföljande artikeln är publicerad i Science as Culture och går under titeln 
”Misuser inventions and the invention of the misuser: Hackers, crackers and 
filesharers”. Min forskningsfråga lyder som följer: hur kan man få syn på anta-
gonistiska relationer i en miljö som ständigt förvandlas av nya innovationer och 
där parternas identiteter och intressen inte är stabila? Jag tar avstamp i Marc 
Bergs polemik mot en äldre teoribildning som studerade införandet av ny teknik 
på arbetsplatsen. Berg hävdar att forskarna som var verksamma inom detta fält 
tog miste när de förutsatte att det finns bestående identiteter mellan vilka en 
varaktig intressekonflikt utspelar sig. I artikeln accepterar jag Bergs utmaning att 
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försöka belägga existensen av antagonistiska relationer också där teknologiut-
vecklingen är som snabbast och som mest genomgripande. Jag föreslår att såda-
na konflikter kan sökas där användarnas uppfinningsrikedom bekämpas av 
rättsväsendet. Fildelning är ett paradexempel. Närvaron av en intressekonflikt 
framträder med önskvärd tydlighet genom de tvångsmedel som riktas mot ut-
vecklare och användare av fildelningstjänster. Intressant att notera är att rättsvä-
sendets åtgärder motarbetas genom innovation. Exemplen är många på hur 
lagstiftningen gjorts verkningslös genom uppkomsten av nya och mer decentra-
liserade metoder för att distribuera filer över datornätverket. Med andra ord är 
det inte så att föreställningen om antagonistiska relationer har blivit irrelevant. 
Tvärtom kan den högt uppskruvade förändringstakten med nya lagar och nya 
fildelningssystem tas som ett kvitto på en pågående, antagonistisk kamp. Denna 
strid utkämpas genom uppfinnandet av ny teknik, nya identiteter och förändra-
de spelregler. 
 
Artikel tre 
Den tredje artikeln, ”Free space optics in the Czech wireless community: Shed-
ding some light on the role of normativity for user-initiated innovations” är 
accepterad för publicering i Science, Technology & Human Values. Artikeln baseras 
på fältstudien som jag gjorde i Tjeckien. Där ifrågasätter jag ett antagande som 
genomsyrar innovationsstudier. Forskare inom fältet brukar utgå ifrån att an-
vändare uppfinner nya produkter för att stilla behov som ännu inte kan till-
fredsställas på marknaden. Detta antagande bygger på en idealtypisk användare 
som kommer färdigt utrustad med konstanta behov. Under min studie i Tjecki-
en mötte jag många som använt Ronja och vars motiv överensstämde med den 
bilden. De hade blivit attraherade till projektet eftersom det erbjöd dem den 
billigaste och bästa metoden för att bygga datornätverk. Flera av dem vittnade 
dock om att de gradvis utvecklat en relation till Ronja som gick långt utöver de 
tekniska funktionerna hos apparaten. Hos de mest inbitna utvecklarna var driv-
kraften av ett helt annat slag. De hade en vision om att sprida ett datornätverk 
som kontrollerades av användarna själva och som skulle kunna utgöra en mot-
vikt till en statligt kontrollerad kommunikationsinfrastruktur. Om de hade sak-
nat en sådan drivkraft hade de inte varit särskilt motiverade att fortsätta med 
utvecklingsarbetet efter det att de hade uppfyllt sina egna behov. En slutsats 
som jag drar i artikeln är att teorier om sociala rörelser kan utgöra en resurs för 
att förklara dynamiken bakom användardriven innovation. 
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Artikel fyra 
Artikel fyra är publicerad i Social Epistemology och heter ”Reconstructivism versus 
critical theory of technology: Alternative perspectives on activism and institu-
tional entrepreneurship in the Czech wireless community”. Här använder jag 
Ronja-studien som utgångspunkt för en jämförelse mellan kritisk teori och en 
variant på konstruktivistisk teori som kallar sig för ”rekonstuktivism”. Anhänga-
re av denna teoribildning är missnöjda med vad de anser vara en brist på poli-
tiskt engagemang inom huvudfåran av konstruktivism. Grundantagandet om att 
världen är konstruerad bedömer de som sunt. De argumenterar för att denna 
insikt kan bli politiskt slagkraftig om frågan ställs hur världen skall konstrueras 
på ett bättre sätt. Vad jag vänder mig emot är att deras argumentation fäster så 
lite avseende vid hur de epistemologiska antagandena färgar de politiska strate-
gierna. Jag utvecklar detta påstående genom min studie av Ronja-projektet. 
Fältstudien gav prov på hur designen av Ronja och designen av andra rivalise-
rande projekt formades av omgivande varurelationer. Detta resonemang förut-
sätter ett teoretiskt ramverk som godtar den filosofiska idén om en samhällelig 
totalitet (av varurelationer). Med andra ord, argumentet låter sig inte göras med 
en konstruktivistisk teori som uteslutande fokuserar på lokalt situerade feno-
men. Både kritisk teori och konstruktivistisk teori kan understödja politisk verk-
samhet, beroende på hur denna verksamhet definieras. En sak som rekonstruk-
tivisterna tar sikte på är riskerna med kommersiellt driven forskning och 
teknologiutveckling. I artikeln argumenterar jag för att om det är politik av det 
slaget som man vill bedriva så är de epistemologiska antaganden som återfinns 
inom kritisk teori att föredra. 
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